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Animals Unmodified: Defining Animals/Defining
Human Obligations to Animals
Taimie L. Bryant
[Tihe definition of women in law and in life is not ours....
[W]omen [are not] measured by standards that reflect the
experience and aspirations of women as such. We are not
allowed to be women on our own terms.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 71
(Harvard 1987).
INTRODUCTION
Palos Verdes Peninsula, home to some of Los Angeles
County's most affluent residents,1 is also home to some of the
world's most beautiful birds, including the India blue peafowl.
Although there are many species of peafowl, India blue peacocks,
with their iridescent blue-green plumage, are the peacocks most
Americans think of when peacocks are mentioned. The
population of India blue peafowl on the Peninsula is particularly
vibrant because, despite the presence of predators, the
population is large enough to generate genetically robust and
healthy individuals.2 Originally from India and resident on the
Peninsula since the 1920s, peacocks, peahens, and peachicks are
so numerous that they may constitute the largest wild flock of
pure India blue peafowl in the United States.
Although peafowl are not native to the Peninsula, they
thrive in those parts of the Peninsula where residents
particularly value retention of natural surroundings. In the
municipality of Rolling Hills Estates, for example, lot sizes are
1 Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. The author thanks Scott Dewey, Gary L.
Francione, Darian M. Ibrahim, Lynn McClelland, Kay Otani, Vicki Steiner, Christopher
D. Stone, Kris Weller and participants at the symposium that resulted in this Volume of
the University of Chicago Legal Forum. Research for this Article was funded by income
from a generous endowment of UCLA Law. School by Bob Barker for teaching and
scholarship in the field of animal rights law.
1 US Census 2000 fact sheet for ZIP code tabulation area 90274, available at
<httpJ/factfinder.census.gov> (last visited Jan 17, 2006).
2 Interview with Dr. Louis Schwartz (Nov 15, 2005).
3 David Seideman, Beauty or the Beast, 31 (3) Natl Wildlife 43 (1993).
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large,4 construction can occur on only a limited percentage of
each lot,5 residential areas have few sidewalks, and manicured
lawns are rejected in favor of abundant naturalistic vegetation.
Many residents keep horses, and there are extensive mutual
easements for horse trails. Rolling Hills Estates has declared
itself an "animal-friendly" city, as evidenced by rules that allow
residents to keep a wide range of animals 6 and a Wild Bird
Protection Ordinance that protects all wild birds and their eggs.7
Despite these apparently idyllic circumstances for peafowl,
the birds have been at the center of many controversies on the
Peninsula because they have characteristics that irritate some of
the humans who live there. For one thing, they can become fairly
raucous during mating season. For another, their penchant for
gazing at their own reflection can result in costly damage to car
paint when birds decide that windshields are ideal reflective
surfaces.
Peafowl, particularly the peacocks, are large birds, and
where they live in great numbers, they constitute an undeniable
presence. Their number is great enough that they partially
define the identities of the human residents of the Peninsula.
Residents identify themselves in terms of whether they like or
dislike the birds, and polarization can easily emerge.8
Municipal governments on the Peninsula are sometimes
caught between those residents who defend the peafowl and
those who would like to eliminate peafowl or reduce their
numbers.9 In one such municipality, Palos Verdes Estates, the
City's plan to trap and remove peafowl resulted in a lawsuit
brought by a nonprofit organization known as Friends of the
Peacocks.' ° In order to settle the dispute, Friends of the Peacocks
4 City of Rolling Hills Estates: Housing Element, Section 4.3, at 14-16 (July 25,
1994), available at <http://www.ci.rolling-hills-estates.ca.us/planning/general-plan-
section_- 4.pdf> (last visited Jan 18, 2006). See also Property Development Standards,
Rolling Hills Estates, Cal, Mun Code Title 17 (2005) (providing lot size and coverage
standards for residential districts in the City of Rolling Hills Estates).
5 Rolling Hills Estates, Cal, Mun Code §§ 17.06.070, 17.06.160, 17.06.250, 17.06.320
(2005).
6 Rolling Hills Estates, Cal, Mun Code § 17.46.020 (2005).
7 Rolling Hills Estates, Cal, Mun Code § 9.04.060 (2005).
8 In his National Wildlife article about the peafowl in Rolling Hills Estates,
Seideman describes how "The Peacock War" has divided the community between
protectors and detractors of the birds. Seideman, 31 (3) Nat'l Widlife at 44 (cited in note
3).
9 Seideman recounts the efforts of the City Council of Rolling Hills Estates to handle
complaints and controversy about peafowl in the early 1990s. Id.
10 Butler v City ofPalos Verdes Estates, 135 Cal App 4th 174 (2005).
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and the City agreed in 1986 to a peafowl management program
that required the City to maintain two flocks of peafowl in
protected areas of the City.1 For their part, Friends of the
Peacocks agreed to a reduced total number of birds. Despite
assiduous peafowl management, the City continued to receive
complaints from some residents who do not like the peafowl,
culminating in a lawsuit filed in 2002 alleging that the City is
maintaining a nuisance by "keeping" "domestic" animals in
violation of restrictions in the deeds by which they received
ownership of the lands involved in the peafowl management
program." Central to the lower court's finding that the City is
violating the deed restrictions against keeping such animals was
the opinion of poultry expert Dr. Francine Bradley, who opined
that the peafowl were "domestic" because they had once been
held captive and because the City was "ranging" them (as, for
example, a rancher "ranges" cattle)."
The City appealed, and on December 2, 2005, the appellate
court reversed the lower court decision, holding that it defied
common sense to find that the peafowl in question are domestic
animals or that the City is keeping them as a cattle rancher
"keeps" cattle. 4 The appellate court defined the peafowl in
question as "wild" or "feral"5 and validated the City's peafowl
management activities, thereby sparing the peafowl flocks from
eradication.16
Attempting to define wild peafowl as "domestic" so that they
can be removed or eradicated is not unique to the litigation in
Palos Verdes Estates. The City of Rolling Hills Estates also
" Id at 177.
12 Id at 178.
13 Id at 178-79, 181.
14 Butler, 135 Cal App 4th at 181-83.
15 The court did not establish that for all times and purposes peafowl are "wild" or
"feral." The court ruled that when, as here, the dispute arises from a contract (in this
case, deed restrictions) in which a definition has not been supplied by the contract itself,
ordinary meanings of the words in dispute would be employed to resolve the dispute. Id
at 183.
16 Since this Article is about animal rights and human duties, it is important to note
that the appellate decision was not a strikingly animal-protective decision even though it
produced a positive outcome for the peafowl flocks and evidenced an apparent judicial
willingness to look behind nonsensical definitions of animals. The underlying facts of this
case are that individual birds are subject to trapping and removal regardless of the
impact on them and that the court analogized this conduct to that of a city's animal
control activities in removing rabid dogs from the community. The Court issued the
narrowest opinion possible on grounds that make the decision relatively inapplicable to
other controversies involving peafowl. It is quite possible to interpret the decision as
protective of the City's efforts to comply with a settlement entered for purposes of
concluding a lawsuit against the City rather than as protective of peafowl. Id at 183-84.
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considered that legal maneuver as a way of facilitating trapping
and removing peafowl without having to amend the City's Wild
Bird Protection Ordinance ("Ordinance"). Having learned that
Dr. Bradley could be hired to provide an opinion that the birds
are not "wild," the City hired her to prepare a report on the
classification of peafowl in Rolling Hills Estates. If the City could
define the birds as "not wild," trapping and removal could occur
without public hearings, which are required to amend the
Ordinance. If trapping and removal of these wild birds, defined
as "domestic" only for purposes of trapping and removing them,
could occur without doing apparent violence to the Ordinance,
the City's definition of itself as protective of wild birds could
remain superficially intact.
Before the City's plan was fully developed, however, the
appellate court in the case against Palos Verdes Estates issued a
tentative ruling that rejected Dr. Bradley's characterization of
the birds as "domestic" in the context of the birds' circumstances
in that particular city, 7 circumstances that are markedly like
those of the birds in Rolling Hills Estates. Soon thereafter, the
City of Rolling Hills Estates announced a return to its original
plan of amending its Ordinance for purposes of trapping and
removing peafowl from certain parts of the City. Unlike
redefining the birds so that the Ordinance would not apply at all,
amending the Ordinance to permit trapping and removal of the
birds would require public hearings, which would bring
community conflict and tensions to the forefront. The benefit of
such hearings, however, is that alternative solutions can also be
brought to the forefront if there are intelligent, committed
defenders of the birds. There are such defenders in Rolling Hills
Estates.
As a direct result of a public hearing held on November 15,
2005, a committee of residents will be established to explore
humane means of population monitoring and stabilization so
that trapping and removal become last-resort measures instead
of first-resort responses to complaints.'" Bringing debates about
peafowl to the surface, instead of defining the birds as "domestic"
in order to trap and remove them without public debate,
provided the public space necessary for the defenders of peafowl
to present alternatives even as to those parts of the City where
17 Id at 181-83.
18 Interview with Linda Retz, resident of Rolling Hills Estates and activist in defense
of the peafowl (Nov 16, 2005) ("Retz Interview").
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peafowl live but their defenders do not. Significantly, in those
areas of the City where peafowl and their defenders are few,
trapping will be legally allowed but with restrictions established
through the advocacy efforts of defenders of peafowl who live in
other areas of the City.19
From some perspectives this outcome seems to be a good
resolution for the peafowl because trapping is limited in location
(only in certain areas with relatively few peafowl) and in purpose
(only for relocation and not for extermination). However, the
process assumed that only humans' interests in protecting or
removing the peafowl were at issue, only limited affirmative
protection other than the right to live (somewhere not of the
peafowl's choice) was provided, and there was very little
consideration of the motives behind and basis for the demand
that peafowl be removed.
This Article begins by considering three issues illustrated in
part by the disputes over peafowl on the Palos Verdes Peninsula:
(1) animals are not legal persons and, therefore, cannot define
their own lives or protect themselves from harm; (2) legal debate
and disputes rarely reach the question of establishing such
affirmative rights for animals because of protracted, obfuscating
battles about legal definitions of animals; and (3) it is preferable
to forego disputes to determine which animals are suited for
rights and instead focus on duties that can be placed on those
who (ab)use animals. 20 At the core of human privilege to exploit
animals is the first: animals are not legal persons with
representatives who can protect them through the exercise legal
rights on their behalf. They have no legal rights through which
they (through legal representatives) can define their lives. Far
from being legal persons, they are instead the legal property of
humans, which makes them subject to the vagaries of human
definitions of them and their lives. Animals have no stable legal
identity as "persons" under the law.
19 For example, if peachicks are trapped without their mothers, or vice versa, the
animals must be released; birds can remain in traps no longer than 4 hours; the trapping
must be paid for by the individual property owner but conducted by a City-contracted
entity; trapped birds must be relocated to lawfully situated, willing recipients and not
destroyed. Voice message from Linda Retz (Dec 15, 2005); City Council Resolution No.
2090, City of Rolling Hills Estates.
20 1 use the term "(ab)user" in those instances in which it is important to include
those users and uses of animals presumed benign along with those obviously abusive
exploiters of animals. There is a variety of opinions among people who think about
animal use and abuse, and in order to capture that, I occasionally use the term "(ab)user"
to include in the discourse a wider range of readers who might not perceive themselves to
be included if one of the other terms ("user" or "exploiter") is used.
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To some extent, as other contributions to this Volume
illustrate, these issues are a function of the relationship between
law and "life"; definitions of human lives and "quality of life" are
not stable, either. There are strong differences in what that
means for living human animals and living non-human animals,
however. Non-human animals' very right to exist is often at
stake, yet challenges to efforts to destroy them are not treated as
raising inherently serious questions about definitions of and
respect for life. We argue about whether peafowl are "wild birds"
and whether they should be trapped and killed or trapped and
relocated. We do not spend much time evaluating the legitimacy
of the request that they be killed or relocated. Further, as long as
the debate about animals centers on whether they suffer, killing
them in such a way that they won't suffer seems to resolve such
conflicts. If animals defined their own lives, merely to die
without suffering would not likely be their preferred solution to
conflicts with humans about habitat.
Because legal definitions of animals that prevent the
development of animals' own rights to define their lives ("legal
personhood") is so central, in Part I, I describe some of the many
ways in which laws and legal processes result in definitions of
animals that readily lead to disrespect and commodification of
animals. Legal definitions of animals change, typically not out of
concern about the consequences to the animals themselves.
Definitions of animals change at the convenience of humans who
want to use them or destroy them. For example, in 2000
California transformed fallow deer from wild animals to domestic
animals with a stroke of the Governor's pen.21 Fallow deer were
defined as domestic animals for purposes of dismembering their
bodies in slaughterhouses, which are legally allowed to
dismember only the bodies of "domestic animals."22 One
consequence of becoming a domestic animal under California's
Food and Agricultural Code § 18943 is evident in legislation
proposed in 2005 by California State Assemblymember Lori
Saldana, which would "provide that: notwithstanding any other
provision of law, it is unlawful to kill or to attempt to kill any
21 This change was five years in coming; however, it was initiated in 1995 as AB 527
and passed in 2000 (AB 1173, enchaptered as Chapter 373, Statutes of 2000), available at
<http://info.sen.ca.gov/pub/99-00/statute/ch0351-0400/ch_373_st2000_ab_1173> (last
visited Jan 18, 2006).
22 "Dead or alive" fallow deer were added to an enumerated list of exclusively
domesticated animal species that are lawfully slaughtered in California slaughterhouses,
see id, modifying Cal Food & Agr § 18943.
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cow or bull, calf, horse, mule, sheep, swine, goat, fallow deer, or
poultry by burning, burying, grinding, drowning, rapid freezing,
or suffocation ....
Not only does becoming a domestic animal for livestock
purposes subject an animal to practices associated with intensive
production of animal-flesh products, once there is an incentive to
ranch them, formerly wild animals are increasingly modified
physiologically and psychologically through domestication
processes whereby humans choose those aspects of animal
biology that suit their interests in easily reducing animal flesh to
products that humans will want to consume. Through
definitional changes, law metaphorically modifies animals and
also paves the way to biologically modify animals.
As the Palos Verdes Peninsula peafowl controversies
illustrate, the motivations and justifications of those who want to
kill or exploit animals are rarely the focus of legal debates about
animals. No one questioned those who, behind the scenes,
pressed their City Council members to amend the Wild Bird
Protection Ordinance. No matter the context, be it a "dangerous"
dog hearing or proposed legislation to legalize ferrets as "pets,"
serious decisions about animals are made without input from the
animals themselves24 and without adequate inquiry into the
motives of those who initiate the process of defining animals in
ways that can have life or death consequences for the animals.
In Part II, I consider several reasons why most legal debates
about animals turn on questions of definitions of animals rather
than on questions about the underlying animal exploitation and
harm that those definitions help to cloak. I also consider the role
of animals' advocates themselves in focusing on definitions of
animals. In doing so, advocates for animals are traveling a path
well-worn by advocates in other social justice movements.
Historically, American social justice movements have begun with
23 The bill, known as the Farmed Animal Reform Act, AB 1587, Cal Legis, Regular
Sess, 2005-06, died in Committee in January of 2006, available at
<http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/bill/asm/ab_1551-1600/ab-1587_bill_20050420-amended_
asm.pdf> (last visited Apr 2, 2006) (emphasis added).
24 One might assume that an animal's owner would be an ideal advocate for animals,
but owners sometimes have conflicts of interest with their own animals. An owner may
agree to kill his barking dog in order to placate a neighbor, for example. One might
wonder about the feasibility of animals' participation in the discourse about them since
they don't speak the language of humans. Yet, ultimately, we should find a way to
include what we believe to be their perspectives, as we do with dependent humans who
cannot speak for themselves. Working through such problems is necessary if our society
is to move toward respect for animals' right to define who they are and the circumstances
of their lives.
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arguments about (1) the need to expand rights-based protection
to include those currently denied rights-holding status or
particular rights and (2) those qualities in excluded people that
make them worthy of having certain kinds of rights.2 ' As in those
other movements to address oppression, seeking the extension of
rights to animals might appear to be a good means of legally
extricating animals from oppression, even if it means protracted
arguments about the qualities in animals that make them
worthy of rights-holding status. Lawyers expect to engage in
debates about legal definitions, so they un-self-consciously
engage in this debate, even when they are operating in political
settings in which other starting points and emphases may be
possible.
Legal advocates for animals engage in definitional activism
for at least three pragmatic reasons: (1) their reliance on the
most commonly accepted notion of justice (that like entities
should be treated alike) requires them to focus on similarities
between humans and animals; (2) their focus on ending animals'
suffering, which leads to definitions of animals that rest on
animals' capacities to suffer; and (3) their concern that they
won't be taken seriously if they don't limit the scope of their
advocacy only to those animals who, like humans, can suffer.
Although all three reasons are significant barriers to
approaching advocacy by other means, it is perhaps the third
reason-concerns about the scope of advocacy-that is the most
worrisome. Advocates worry that if animals worthy of rights are
25 Civil rights activists, feminists, gay rights advocates, and the disability rights
community have all used the argument that a just society would protect these victimized
groups from abuse because of their similarity to legally protected groups. See, for
example, William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 Mich L Rev 2062, 2071-72 (2002) ("If
the social group was able to show political strength ... its organizational leaders would
move toward a public stance which denied inferiority of the group's defining trait: There
is no material difference between blacks and whites, except those created by society and
law ... ."); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 Cal L Rev 1279,
1287-91 (1987) ("Women's inequality ... results when society devalues women because
they differ from the male norm."); Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond
Formal Equality and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 Ohio St L J
867, 919-21 (2000) (discussing shared humanity theory as a means of addressing the
dangers of theories of sameness and "homogenizing" strategies associated with the
similarity argument); William M. Newman, American Pluralism: A Study of Minority
Groups and Social Theory 59 (Harper & Row 1973) (describing assimilation by immigrant
groups, where "[the central tenet ... was that new groups must conform to the cultural
tradition of the majority or dominant group"); Kenneth L. Karst, Belonging to America 1-
27 (Yale 1989) (docunienting the desire to belong as motivating "outsiders" and their
utilization of constitutional law to secure equal, albeit often only formally equal,
treatment in American society).
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not defined first, a prohibition on harming animals would seem
to include even bacteria or termites. Could one wash one's hands
or protect one's house from termites? Legal advocates for
animals' rights fail to fully appreciate that this is exactly the
reasoning of opponents of animal rights; the point at which they
begin to worry is simply different. While animals' advocates
draw one line so that they can wash their hands without concern
for bacteria (their only worry being safeguarding their own
health), (ab)users of animals draw another line so that they can
eat animals without concern for animals (their only worry being
their getting enough protein). It is too simplistic to say that
humans do not need to eat animals but that they do need to
wash their hands. Although humans really don't need to eat
animals, they do need to eat, and thoughtless, intensive
production of a plant-based diet could have seriously harmful
effects on animals, the planet, and themselves. Thoughtless,
intensive destruction of bacteria and bacteria strains is no more
necessary than eating animals. It is actually harmful to proceed
in the manner most likely to kill the greatest number of bacteria
the most quickly, and, by "harmful," I mean harmful to the
bacteria, harmful to animals, harmful to the environment,
harmful to people, and harmful to values that support
stewardship rather than domination of nature. When people do
not use the least harmful means of producing a plant-based diet
or the least bacteria-destructive means of washing their hands,
they needlessly subject all animals, people, and the environment
to harm. Defining which animals are worthy of protection on the
one hand and then destroying the natural nexus in which all
animals and people live with one another is counter-productive
to the aims of animals' advocates.
This Article argues for a different kind of line-drawing; it
argues for drawing lines derived from examination of our own
conduct rather than drawing lines on the basis of qualities in
animals or aspects of the environment that do or do not qualify
them for rights. As legal scholar Christopher D. Stone notes,
there is a moral basis for grounding our inquiry in the behavior
of humans rather than in qualities of animals:
The moral repugnance at traditional "rattlesnake round-
ups" in some parts of the United States, in which the
torment and slaughter of snakes is accompanied by feasts
and celebration, has less to do with the pain of the snakes
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than with the brutishness, arrogance, and ecological
stupidity of the perpetrators.
Ultimately, through establishing duties to the environment
and to animals perhaps we can whittle away at the legal
definition of animals as "property," which is the principal process
by which law contributes to disrespect and commodification of
animals." By establishing duties without first establishing
rights for "worthy" species of animals, advocates will not only
engage in less protracted debates about which animals are
worthy, they will be preserving the only means by which animals
will be able to define themselves if and when they ever do receive
legal entitlements to define and protect themselves. As I will
explain later, this does not mean that animals' advocates should
lay down their advocacy for animals and become
environmentalists. Environmentalism is surely necessary, but it
is not sufficient because environmentalism involves choices that
have better or worse impacts on animals now living on the earth.
Environmentalism alone will not give rise to adequate inquiry
into and cessation of human entitlements to (ab)use animals.
Part III examines the possibility of establishing duties to
animals without initially specifying rights for animals. I argue
that while it might seem that rights must be established first
and that duties to animals must be derived from those rights, it
may be possible and preferable that duties be established first.
Moreover, I argue against the idea that duties must be linked
reciprocally to rights. The reciprocal nature of rights and duties
appears necessary from an Anglo-American jurisprudential
26 Christopher D. Stone, Ethics and International Environmental Law, in Dan
Bodansky, Jutta Brunne, and Ellen Hey, eds, Handbook on International Environmental
Law(forthcoming Oxford 2006).
27 There are other socio-cultural sources of disrespect and commodification of
animals. Denial of legal personhood and the status of property coalesce in creating a
formidable obstacle to protecting animals. Gary L. Francione emphasizes the property
status of animals as the legal determinant of their lesser and vulnerable status. Others
do not subscribe fully to the idea that property status is that detrimental. Francione
addresses some of those arguments and concerns in Equal Consideration and the Interest
ofNonhuman Animals in Continued Existence: A Response to Professor Sunstein, 2006 U
Chi Legal F 231, 236-47.
On a socio-cultural level, it is possible to imagine abuse of animals that does not
necessarily entail reducing them to property in the normal sense. An example is killing
animals for sport with no intention of taking trophies or consuming their meat, hides,
feathers, etc.-which certainly goes on in real life, as with people who shoot feral cats-
unless the very act of deciding to kill an animal (or human) wantonly is construed as
exerting ownership, which is a stretch. However, I maintain, as does Francione, that




perspective, but there is no logical or pragmatic necessity to
premise duties on rights, other than socio-cultural and historical
familiarity with that route. I allude briefly to Asian law systems
and other legal systems that have not been premised on
reciprocal rights and duties. I also rely on philosophical and legal
arguments raised by philosopher Mary Midgley and legal scholar
Christopher D. Stone for the proposition that it is possible (and
sometimes preferable) for duties to exist even when the entities
to which duties are owed are not likely candidates for rights
entitlements (for example, future generations of humans or
aspects of the environment such as rivers or trees). I use
examples from the American legal context for the argument that
such an approach is feasible in the United States, and, in fact,
already exists.
Ultimately, placing duties on (ab)users of animals enables us
to do what is absolutely essential: focus on the motives and
behaviors of those institutions and humans who harm animals.
As difficult as it may seem to protect animals without first
deciding which or whom we want to protect, it is the only
meaningful way to begin addressing the problems experienced by
animals, and it is also the only means by which we can protect
the web of life upon which animals depend for their very
existence. Protecting animals must mean challenging their
(ab)users' practices, and animals' advocates must arrive at that
challenge without endless disputes over definitions of animals.
This is not to say that the problems raised by proceeding
with duties first do not exist or should be ignored because of the
need for duties. Nor is it to say that it is somehow easier to
decide which duties to establish than to decide which
entitlements animals should have. It is to say that we have little
choice but to confront those difficulties head on. The overarching
difficulty is to avoid establishing duties that do no more than
reinforce the status quo of exploitation. If the duty is only to
treat animals more kindly as they are exploited, then
exploitation will be furthered, not reduced. Thus, the real work
of establishing duties lies in advocacy that forces compliance in
accordance with the rights-based principles first enunciated by
legal scholar Gary L. Francione in his plan for the incremental
establishment of rights for animals.28 Even if incremental in
28 In his book Rain Without Thunder, Francione sets out criteria of incremental
reform that could lead to rights for animals. Those include the requirements that any
specific proposed reform prohibit an act or acts of exploitation that go to the heart of the
exploitative enterprise and to the heart of animals' basic needs, without substituting
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nature, advocacy must involve establishing duties that can be
realized as prohibitions of exploitative practices: practices that
go to the heart of animals' status as the legal property or
potential property of humans, practices that impede animals'
right to define themselves by their own conduct and lives in the
world.
I. THE ROLE OF LAW IN DEFINING ANIMALS
Not being heard is not just a function of lack of
recognition, not just that no one knows how to listen to
you, although it is that; it is also silence of the deep kind,
the silence of being prevented from having anything to
say.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 39
(Harvard 1987).
Humans do not allow animals to define their own lives for
themselves. Animals are effectively silenced, prevented from
having anything to say about their lives and their preferences,
by humans' ability to control them and by humans'
preoccupation with animals' utility to humans. Humans define
animals by reference to their own situations, their own
preferences, and their own operative categories of animals.29 The
peafowl on Palos Verdes Peninsula cannot ask local government
to provide better circumstances of life for them; they can only
"hope" that local government will protect them from being
labeled "pests" worthy of eradication. ° Palos Verdes Peninsula
residents who like the peafowl wonder how a "big beautiful bird
like an India blue peacock" could fall into the category of a "pest,"
a term that legally permits the eradication of animals from one's
own property, if not from others' property.3' People think that
another form of exploitation in its place. Gary L. Francione, Rain Without Thunder: The
Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement 190-219 (Temple 1996).
29 Lynda Birke, Feminism, Animals and Science: The Naming of the Shrew 16-29
(Open University 1994); Barbara Noske, Beyond Boundaries: Humans and Animals 61-
70 (Black Rose 1997); Arnold Arluke and Clinton Sanders, Regarding Animals 9 (Temple
1996).
30 See note 28.
31 See, for example, Haw Rev Stat § 711-1109 (prohibiting the killing "without need"
of "any animal ... other than pests"). The City's apparent decision to define wild peafowl
as "feral domestic" birds allowed individuals to trap and remove peafowl from their own
property. Retz Interview (cited in note 18).
The concept of an animal as "pest" sheds some interesting light on the concept of
animals as "property," since a pest usually will be an animal that is seen as not fit to be
owned either live or dead, but only fit to be destroyed. So the "right" to kill a pest may not
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the term labels a class of animals, but the word "pest" is
conclusory rather than descriptive of the animal. It labels a
person's conclusion about the desirability of the animal from the
person's perspective, and, in that sense, says much more about
the person than anything objective about the animal.
Owners of real property can decide for themselves whether
an animal is a "pest" and kill or remove the animal from their
property, unless there are legal definitions of the animal that
override that decision. For example, if a "pest" animal is a
member of an endangered species, the Endangered Species Act
would override the landowner's decision to kill the animal.32
Another example is the case of Rolling Hills Estates, where the
peafowl were spared because the birds are "wild" for purposes of
the Wild Bird Protection Ordinance, even if they may be "pests"
from the perspective of a landowner seeking to eradicate them.
Since the Ordinance does not exempt pest eradication activities
from its prohibition on harm to wild birds or their eggs, the
Ordinance protects the birds even though they could also be
considered "pests."
This is a perennial issue. Cute bunnies are viewed as "pets"
when they live indoors but are quickly deemed legal "nuisances"
when they are outdoors in large enough numbers to annoy
people.33 The same is true of deer and Canada geese: beautiful
and valuable in small numbers, yet completely vulnerable to
lawful destruction as "pests" when their numbers exceed human
convenience or preferences.' "Pest" is a term that has a socio-
come from a claim of ownership of the underlying land so much as from a claim that the
animal, wherever the animal is, should not be allowed to live.
32 16 USC § 1531 et seq (2005).
33 Dave McKibben, South O.C. Community Has Rabbits in Its Sights, LA Times B1
(Mar 25, 2005). See also Benjamin Spillman, Bunnies in Valley Better Beware, The
Desert Sun 1A (Apr 28, 2004) (discussing bill by Assemblyman John Benoit, R-Palm
Desert, that would make it easier to legally kill rabbits responsible for destroying
homeowner landscapes).
3 The Humane Society of the United States ("HSUS") provides information about
changing population sizes of Canada geese. When the populations are large, killing geese
is often proposed, but HSUS has developed a protocol for addling geese eggs so that the
number of geese decreases. HSUS, Animal Protection Groups Question Federal Plan to
Kill Millions of Canada Geese, available at <http'//www.hsus.org/press-and-
publications/press releases/animal-protection-groupsquestion_federalplan to kill_mill
ions_of.canadageese.html> (last visited May 10, 2006).
Similarly, deer hunting is proposed as a means of reducing the deer population for
pest control purposes or as a humane measure. On closer inspection, though, it seems
that hunting seasons are rarely primarily about deer population control. HSUS provides
information about the relationship between hunting and population management. HSUS,
Learn the Facts About Hunting available at <http:J/www.hsus.org/wildlifeissues-facing-
wildlife/hunting/learn the factsabouthunting.html> (last visited May 10, 2006). Lawful
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cultural starting point and a legal ending point that excludes any
value of the animal's life to him- or herself. The reasoning that
cascades into the death of the animal is invisible if there are no
advocates for an animal defined as a "pest." No one stumps for
the protection of the rats living in their midst the way residents
of the Peninsula stumped for the protection of the peafowl living
in their midst.
Even rats are not consistently seen as "pests," though. There
are people who keep them as companion animals, and those
people could expect the same legal protections with respect to
veterinary care as the owners of other companion animals. There
are other people who value rats but for the purpose of
experimentation. In laboratory settings rats are valuable
"resources," and disrupting or vandalizing a facility in which
they are (ab)used can subject a person to severe penalties under
the Animal Enterprises Protection Act of 1992."5 Under that Act,
the definition of "animal enterprise" broadly encompasses any
enterprise that uses any animal. 6 Yet, some of the very same
animals used in "animal enterprises" are not defined as
"animals" under the Animal Welfare Act, which sets limited
standards for humane husbandry practices in research
laboratories." Scientists who use rats have no obligations of care
hunting takes place through permitting systems designed by Departments of Fish and
Game to modify the deer population so that a plentiful supply of deer are available to
hunt or so that the most desirable kind of deer (such as those with large antlers) are
available in greater numbers. Vermont's Department of Fish and Wildlife intentionally
manages hunting for the purpose of pleasing hunters, not for the purpose of reducing
populations. This information is available at <http/www.vtfishandwildlife.com/
Detail.CFM?Agency-ID=932> (last visited May 10, 2006) (contending that some deer
hunting regulations would create short-term losses in deer hunting take but that there
would be more deer with larger antlers to take in the future). Licensing hunters to kill
male deer specifically leaves in place female deer so that they will produce fawns
susceptible to hunting in the future. Hunting disproportionate numbers of males may
reduce the population but the reduction may be occurring by starvation. In other words,
the relationship between hunting and population control is complicated. Jeremy Alcorn,
Hunting as a Method of Population Control, available at <http'/www.veganvanguard.
com/positionsfhunting-population-control.html> (last visited May 10, 2006).
35 18 USC § 43 (2005).
36 18 USC § 43(d) (1) (2005) (defining "animal enterprise" as "(A) a commercial or
academic enterprise that uses animals for food or fiber production, agriculture, research,
or testing; (B) a zoo, aquarium, circus, rodeo, or lawful competitive animal event; or (C)
any fair or similar event intended to advance agricultural arts and sciences").
37 Under the Animal Welfare Act ("AWA"), "[t]he term 'animal' means any live or
dead dog, cat, monkey (nonhuman primate mammal), guinea pig, hamster, rabbit, or such
other warm-blooded animal, as the Secretary [of Agriculture] may determine is being
used or is intended for use, for research, testing, experimentation, or exhibition purposes,
or as a pet ... ." 7 USC § 2132(g) (2005). After considerable pressure from animal
advocacy organizations, the Secretary of Agriculture agreed to extend the law to cover
rats, mice, and birds but the matter was considered "pending" until amendments to the
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to them under the Animal Welfare Act because they are not
animals for purposes of that law, even if rats are animals for
purposes of the Animal Enterprises Protection Act.
Just as a rat is not an animal when the law says she isn't
and is an animal when the law says she is, a chicken is not
legally an animal unless a specific law defines chickens as
animals. Chickens may be "animals" for purposes of enforcing
cockfighting prohibitions,3" but chickens are not animals for
purposes of the Humane Slaughter Act,39 the only federal statute
that confers any protection at all to animals dismembered for
food in this country.40 Although a few states may have anti-
cruelty statutes that purport to cover all "animals," either
because of disputes about what constitutes an "animal" under
the statute or because of lack of prosecutorial interest in
challenging chicken-flesh production practices,41 chickens can be
killed in any number of grossly painful ways-whatever is
expedient for the manufacturer of chicken flesh products."
Chickens are also invisible legally while they are being raised for
their eggs or their flesh. In fact, most animals produced and
dismembered for food are legally invisible; there is no regulation
of the flesh-food industry that relates to the care animals (do not)
receive while they are "in production." 3 Flesh-food animals do
AWA in 2002 removed the possibility. David Favre, Animals: Welfare, Interests, and
Rights 361 (Animal Legal and Historic Center 2003).
38 See, for example, State v Cleve, 980 P2d 23, 26 (NM 1999) (clarifying that the
"laws in New Mexico governing hunting and fishing preempt application of the cruelty-to-
animals statute to the hunting of game animals"). See also People v Baniqued, 85 Cal
App 4th 13, 20-21 (App Ct 2000) (construing "every dumb creature" broadly: "the plain
language of the statute shows that the Legislature did not intend to restrict the phrase to
mammals ... [t]he category 'every dumb creature' plainly includes roosters and other
birds"). Note that cockfighting prohibitions are not typically enacted for reasons of animal
protection so much as for purposes of controlling gambling and ancillary crime.
" 7 USC § 1902 (2005).
40 Only California has a state humane slaughter law for poultry. Jordan Curnutt,
Animals and the Law: A Sourcebook 163 (ABC-CLIO 2001). Even so, "spent hens" hens
who no longer produce eggs on the schedule preferred by egg producers-are not covered
by that law. That is one reason they were included in California Assemblymember Lori
Saldana's proposal in 2005 to ban the killing of poultry (and other specified species) by
"burning, burying, grinding, drowning, rapid freezing, or suffocation .... ." See note 23.
41 For example, Alabama provides that cruelty to "animals" other than dogs and cats
is a class B misdemeanor, but it does not provide a statutory definition of what
constitutes an "animal," nor have there been reported prosecutions of cruelty to factory
farmed animals under the statute. Alabama Stat §13-A-11-14.
42 See note 40.
43 David J. Wolfson, Beyond the Law: Agribusiness and the Systemic Abuse of
Animals Raised for Food or Food Production, 2 Animal L 123, 124 (1996); David J.
Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse: Animals, Agribusiness and the
Law: A Modem American Fable, in Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum, eds,
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not typically exist even for purposes of animal anti-cruelty
statutes, most of which explicitly exempt them or standard
industry exploitative practices by which they are harmed.' They
are not just omitted from legal consideration, they are actively
defined out of legal existence for purposes of particular
statutes.45
The legal process of adjudicating disputes involves the same
lack of a stable protective legal identity for animals. For
example, the appellate court in Butler v City of Palos Verdes,46
makes clear that it has decided that peafowl are "wild" or "feral"
only as to the dispute before that court.47 The court notes
explicitly that in other contexts, depending on the uses to which
peafowl have been put, peafowl could be defined as "domestic" or
"ranged" animals. Another example is the analysis and decision
in Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v Comella,4 s in which the
court addressed whether a dog is a "domestic animal" for
purposes of resolving a dispute about the application of a statute
that provides for penalizing an owner of a dog who "kill[s] or
Animal Rights.- Current Debates and New Directions 205, 208 (Oxford 2004).
44 Wolfson, 2 Animal L at 124 (cited in note 43); Wolfson and Sullivan, Foxes in the
Henhouse at 208 (cited in note 43). For an overview of the anti-cruelty statutes and
exemptions, see Sonia S. Waisman, Bruce A. Wagman, and Pamela D. Frasch, Animal
Law: Cases and Materials 399-446 (Carolina Academic 2002).
45 Many state anti-cruelty statutes specifically exempt standard farming practices.
Waisman, Wagman, and Frasch, Animal Law: Cases and Materials at 399-446 (cited in
note 44). In those states, factory farmed animals are not covered by the anti-cruelty
statutes to the extent that they experience harms due to standard industry practices.
Although wanton acts of malicious cruelty that fall outside a standard industry practice
could be prosecuted, the vast amount of suffering that factory farmed animals experience
is due to industry practices defended as necessary for the production of flesh-food
products. David J. Wolfson and Mariann Sullivan note the following as to the
approximately 9.5 billion animals they report as killed in food production each year in the
United States:
[Miaking this many animals disappear from the law is an enormous task. It has been
accomplished, in significant part, through the efforts of the industry that owns these
animals to obtain complete control, in one way or another, over the law that governs
it. While this is not an unusal effort on the part of industry generally, the farmed-
animal industry's efforts have been exceptionally successful. The industry has
devised a legally unique way to accomplish its purpose: it has persuaded legislatures
to amend criminal statutes that purport to protect farmed animals from cruelty so
that it cannot be prosecuted for any farming practice itself determines is acceptable,
with no limit whatsoever on the pain caused by such practices. As a result, in most of
the United States, prosecutors, judges, and juries no longer have the power to
determine whether or not farmed animals are treated in an acceptable manner. The
industry alone defines the criminality of its own conduct.
Wolfson and Sullivan, Foxes in the Henhouse at 206 (cited in note 43).
46 135 Cal App 4th 174 (2005).
47 Id at 181-83; Seideman, 31 (3) Nat'l Wildlife at 8 (cited in note 3).
48 735 A2d 738 (Pa Commw Ct 1999).
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inflict[s] severe injury on a domestic animal without provocation
while off the owner's property."49 Comella's dog had severely
injured another dog, but Comella contended that "domestic
animal" did not include dogs and that the term was intended to
refer only to animals kept as livestock. The appellate court
decided that for purposes of the statute involved, a companion
animal dog is, as a matter of law, a "domestic animal.""
Animals must be defined in order to resolve each and every
dispute and in each and every law that refers to them because,
as a general legal matter, animals have no consistent legal
identity separate and apart from the various statutes that
regulate or allow humans to use them. Stated differently,
animals are not "legal persons." A "legal person" is allowed by
law to define his or her life through individual choices such as
work, relationships, and residence. When a person is not
mentally or physically able to do so independently, the law
provides for a guardian who must act in the best interest of the
individual he or she is charged with protecting. By contrast,
animals, as the property of humans, cannot define their own
lives, and there is no law requiring humans to make decisions "in
the best interest" of an animal because humans are not
"guardians" of individual animals who have affirmative rights
under the law. Even if individual people may care about specific
animals in ways other than those animals' legal property value,
under the current law, animals are treated as actual or potential
resources for humans. As Gary L. Francione contends, this is the
legal wellspring of human entitlements to exploit animals.5'
Quite the opposite from enjoying the basic legal identity of a
"legal person" with affirmative rights to live a life defined by
one's own preferences and abilities, animals are legally defined
by reference to their utility to humans; they are the legal
property or potential property of humans.
Animals' legal status as potential or current property and
their lack of legal personhood are the grandparents of all specific
legal definitions of animals. However, removal of the property
status of animals and establishing legal personhood are two
quite different things. Removal of the property status would
secure the "negative" right of not being property. Establishing
49 Id at 738.
50 Id at 740.
51 Gary L. Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law 15-32 (Temple 1995);
Francione, Rain Witbout Thunder 126-39 (cited in note 28); Gary L. Francione,
Introduction to Animal ghts: Your Child or the Dog?50-80 (Temple 2000).
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legal personhood would provide the "affirmative" right to define
one's own life and protect oneself by way of the law. Simple
removal of animals' status as the property of humans does not
provide for affirmative rights to structure a life, and it still
leaves open the possibility of exploitation by people. Without
affirmative rights and a means to defend those rights, a "freed"
animal could not choose to live in a particular habitat or protect
his/her food source, for example. There is no tort law provision
that he or she could use to redress wrongful acts. He or she could
be hunted, tormented, denied his or her freedom, and killed
perhaps even more easily than can an owned animal. Who would
be able to prevent those acts, if animals are not property but do
not have affirmative rights with legal standing sufficient to
protect those rights? At least in the case of an owned animal, the
owner would be able, if he or she chose, to prevent or redress
other humans' cruel acts against the animal by way of tort law
protections for harm to property.52  Similarly, criminal
prosecution for cruelty is unlikely when the victims of cruelty are
unowned and cannot vote elected officials out of office for failure
to address their interests.53 Thus, just being "Not Property" does
not in itself provide animals with affirmative means of
establishing their own lives or protection against abuse and cruel
treatment.
There are many challenges in attempting to secure rights for
animals. Animals' status as property must be addressed before
52 This is not to say that the property status of animals confers significant protection
to animals. Not only do owners have the choice as to whether to protect an animal,
animals do not have ready means to protect themselves from their owners. Moreover,
damages tied to the market value of animals are so low as to make legal recourse by their
owners economically unfeasible. For considerations of the market value of animals as it
affects damages for harms done to animals, see William C. Root, Note, "Man's Best
Friend": Property or Family Member? An Examination of the Legal Classification of
Companion Animals and Its Impact of Damages Recoverable for Their Wrongful Death or
Injury, 47 Vill L Rev 423, 424 (2002) ("At the forefront of this [valuation of loss] debate is
whether pet owners should be able to recover damages for genuine mental suffering.").
See also Debra Squires-Lee, Note, In Defense of Floyd: Appropriately Valuing Animals in
Tort, 70 NYU L Rev 1059 (1995) (dealing specifically with the problem of valuation);
Rebecca Huss, Valuing Man's and Woman's Best Friend: The Moral and Legal Status of
Companion Animals, 86 Marq L Rev 47 (Fall 2002) (placing the issue of market value
calculations in the context of general moral and legal valuation of companion animals);
Geordie Duckler, Animals: A Legal and Anthropological Argument for Special Valuation,
8 Animal L 199 (2002) (arguing that "special" valuation for companion animals depends
upon a combination of legal and scientific assessments).
53 For example, I suspect that the City Attorney of Los Angeles would be much more
interested in prosecuting cruel acts against street dogs if dogs could vote him out of office.
As it is, elected officials can satisfy voters with issues such as education, crime, and
environmental quality even if they are not interested in addressing cruelty to animals.
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or in concert with establishing those affirmative rights necessary
for animals to define their own lives and to protect themselves
from human exploitation.54  Advocates have not yet fully
identified those affirmative rights that are necessary for animals
to structure their own lives. One reason for this may be that a
focus on stopping human torment of animals, which results from
animals' status as property, does not easily permit concurrent
focus on which rights would most effectively enable animals to
live lives of their own choice. Freeing elephants from the status
of property that allows zoos and circuses to exploit them is a
different enterprise than pursuing those rights for elephants
that would enable them to define their own existence. Chipping
away at humans' entitlements to use their property animals as
they choose is difficult enough. When it comes to the second step
of establishing affirmative rights for animals, there are problems
of flex in the concept of legal personhood itself 5 and of
identifying different affirmative rights to self-fulfillment and
protection which would necessarily vary among animals. 6
Even more challenging than deciding which affirmative
rights are fundamental to each species is determining what to do
about the exercise of such rights in a world that has been so
badly damaged by human activity. Even if we could determine
which rights, in the abstract, are most useful to animals, we
would still have difficulty providing a meaningful environment-
both geophysically and socioculturally-for the exercise of those
rights. For example, we might decide that it is most important
for animals to have basic rights to their natural habitats, but
human activity has destroyed so much habitat that now animals
54 In this sense, the legal path of animals is comparable to that of enslaved people
whose legal freedom under the Thirteenth Amendment had to be accompanied by legal
status as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment. For a legal historical account of
that recognition and accompanying legislative reform, see Eugene Gressman, The
Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 Mich L Rev 1323, 1324-25 (1952).
55 Ngaire Naffine surveys the field of possible formulations of a legal person and
concludes that there are three basic types: conceptions of a legal person as a purely
abstract construction for the purpose of accomplishing legal goals; conceptions of a legal
person as an entity that bears similarities to everyday understandings of what a "person"
is; and conceptions of a legal person as a moral agent. Naffine notes that even though the
first type exists in theory, in practice it is infused with understandings more indicative of
the other two types. The narrowest type (the third type) is the most problematic for
people who do not have the prototypical characteristics of individuality and autonomy. As
Naffme recognizes, all conceptions of personhood as applied to animals are problematic.
Ngaire Naffine, Who are Law's Persons? From Cheshire Cats to Responsible Subjects, 66
Mod L Rev 346, 346-67 (2003).
56 For example, the right to associate with others of one's kind would also have to
include the right to be a loner. What is the best habitat for an animal who has never
known freedom?
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are squeezed in ways that would make rights-based conflicts
inevitable and irresolvable.
Another aspect of the problem of rights that can be
meaningfully exercised is the question of how legal entitlements
to animals would intersect. If an animal's rights are qualified or
enforced subject to the rights of other living beings, what kind of
protection will his or her rights actually provide? For instance,
how would the rights of particular animals (for example,
songbirds) compare to the rights of other animals (for example,
feral cats) living in the same habitat? How would the rights of
animals compare to the rights of humans? In order to prevail in
contests with other rights-holders, animals' rights would have to
be unwaivable, but no one has absolutely unwaivable rights-
even basic rights of humans can be over-ridden.57
These problems--(1) removing the status of property, (2)
identifying affirmative rights that animals need to define and
protect their own lives, and (3) anticipating solutions to problems
of inter-species conflict based on their legal entitlements-are
extremely difficult because they involve massive reorientation of
society and the law.
These problems are compounded by the fact that animals'
advocates are not working in a neutral socio-political or legal
environment. Equally central to the question of shifting
paradigms about animals is the influence of those who oppose
such a paradigmatic shift. Institutional exploiters of animals,
such as laboratories and agribusinesses that produce factory-
farmed animal products, are active participants in the process of
legally defining animals.58 For a long time they have controlled
57 In Part III of this Article I write more about this problem in connection with the
work of Christopher D. Stone who has argued for rights entitlements to be held by
aspects of nature such as rivers and trees. Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have
Standing?: Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects 6-11 (Kaufmann 1972).
58 Institutional (ab)users of animals have tremendous power to define what is cruel
as to the treatment of animals in their institutions because "[i]n the case of farmed
animals, federal law is essentially irrelevant. The Animal Welfare Act, 7 USC § 2131(g)
(2003), which is the primary piece of federal legislation relating to animal protection and
which sets certain basic standards for their care, simply exempts farmed animals,
thereby making something of a mockery of its title." Wolfson and Sullivan, Foxes in the
Henhouse at 208 (cited in note 43). And,
[c]ontrary to regulatory schemes generally set up by legislatures to govern
industry conduct, criminal anticruelty statutes which govern the farming
industry's treatment of animals do not provide for the promulgation of specific
regulations to govern animal welfare, and the farming industry is not subject to
any sort of regulatory enforcement of farmed-animal welfare standards, does
not undergo any inspections to determine whether farmed animals are being
afforded appropriate treatment, and is not answerable to any governmental
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the political and legal discourse about animals by virtue of
claims that those untrained in their practices are not qualified to
challenge those practices and that the valuable goods they
produce cannot be produced any other way. Opponents of
increased animal protection are able to keep the discourse
trained on all the problems associated with animal rights; they
avoid having the discourse trained on their own violent and
exploitative practices.
Institutional exploiters of animals have also controlled
actual, on-the-ground definitions of animals. By that I mean they
have controlled the nature of animals themselves. For example,
according to Science News, humans' preference for and
overfishing of larger fish has actually resulted in a reduction in
the mean size of "food fish" to one-fifth of their previous size. 9
Science News, focusing on the human interest involved,
suggested that this may be problematic because smaller fish
have lower survivability than larger fish.60 In response to this
report, a reader wrote the following: "This is not cause for alarm.
This is cause for a decision: What do we want, small fish or large
fish? Humans are the only creatures on the planet who care
about fish size, and the only ones empowered to change it."6
Stated differently, "A fish is a fish if it is socially classified as
one, and that classification is only concerned with fish to the
extent that scaly things living in the sea help society define
itself... . Animals are indeed a blank paper which can be
inscribed with any message, and symbolic meaning that the
social wishes."62
While it is breathtakingly arrogant to do so, humans are, in
fact, legally and technologically empowered to define and to
change the very nature of fish. In his book Fishy Business:
Salmon, Biology, and the Social Construction of Nature, Rik
Scarce writes about the domestication and commodification of
administrative agency (federal or state) on the subject of farmed-animal
welfare.
Id at 209. The same could be said of the situation of animals exploited in scientific and
medical laboratories.
59 Janet Raloff, Empty Nets: i'sheries May Be Crippling Themselves by Targeting
the Big Ones, 167 Science News 360, 360 (June 5, 2004).
60 This is because smaller fish produce a smaller nutrient sac for fish embryos to
consume while they are developing. Id at 361.
61 Peter Wilson, Letter, 168 Science News 95 (Aug 6, 2005).
62 Philip W. Sutton, Nature, Environment and Society 58 (Palgrave Macmillan 2004)
(quoting Y, Tester, Animals and Society: The Humanity of Animal Rights (Routledge
1991)).
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salmon.6 3 Human farming of formerly wild salmon creates its
own selective pressures on salmon, but the process of
transforming these wild creatures effectively into man-made
machines to produce salmon flesh is picking up speed due to the
miniaturization of information gathering tools:
Perhaps the simplest of these new research technologies
is the "coded wire tag." Almost too small to be seen by the
naked eye, these tiny pieces of metal are injected into the
heads of young fish before they are released from
hatcheries... . Each wire is notched, and the microscopic
indentations may carry information such as the location
of the hatchery, date of release, and the like. When the
fish return to the hatchery as adults, the tags are located
using metal detectors, cut out, and read under a
microscope. This allows researchers to track high-seas
migrations and to conduct a range of other studies.'
Scarce documents how, through such microtechnological
developments, the salmon themselves become the research
instruments by which salmon are studied. Through the injection
of metal wire into their heads, salmon are forcibly enlisted in the
process of gathering information that will allow deliberate
scientific modification of all aspects of their physical and
psychological identities and lives.65 Colors, body size, body form,
temperament, intelligence, tolerance for various temperatures-
all of these characteristics can be chosen by humans through
information, selection, and genetic manipulation.66
63 Rik Scarce, Fishy Business: Salmon, Biology and the Social Construction of Nature
(Temple 2000).
64 Id at 112.
65 Id.
66 In fish alone, there has been extensive breeding and transgenic research to modify
characteristics. Michael Masser and Rex Dunham, Production of Hybrid Catfish,
Southern Regional Aquaculture Center (July 1998), available at
<http'//www.aces.edu/dept/fisheries/aquaculture/pdf/190fs.pdf> (last visited Apr 2, 2006)
(describing the "superior characteristics" of the CxB catfish hybrid, including increased
tolerance to crowded conditions, and ease of harvesting); Zhiyuan Gong, et al,
Development of transgenic fish for ornamental and bioreactor by strong expression of
fluorescent proteins in the skeletal muscle, 308 Biochem and Biophys Rsrch Comm 58
(Academic 2003) (introducing fluorescent protein genes from various sources into
zebrafish to express "vivid fluorescent colors"); Alimuddin, et al, Enhancement of EPA
and DHA biosynthesis by over-expression of masu salmon delta6-desaturase-l'ke gene in
zebrafish, 14 Transgenic Rsrch 159 (2005) (using transgenic technology to increase the
amount of omega-3 fatty acids in fish); Robert H. Devlin, et al, Growth of domesticated
transgenic fish, 409 Nature 781 (2001) (discussing the growth rates of transgenic fish
that over-express growth hormone); Ailye Sarmasik, et al, Production of transgenic
medaka with increased resistance to bacterial pathogens, 4 Marine Biotechnology 310
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Not surprisingly, Scarce found that as respect for human
power over the fish increased, respect for the fish themselves
declined. He notes the rarity of conservation biologist Paul
McGuire's point of view:
I care about the animal... . I've seen beautiful salmon
runs, and I've seen their ebb and flow with the weather,
with the climate, with the terrain, and how they fit into
the system. It's a marvel to behold. I look far beyond the
economic value, as you can tell. So over many years and a
variety of studies, I've just gained such an awe and
appreciation for their resilience, . . and their beauty-
their pure and simple beauty, visually and in regards to
their life history... . I've given a lot of thought to them
and how they all fit together, how they've evolved. You
can't help but gain a great appreciation for them as a
fellow organism that fits into the Northwest.67
Scarce comments that this view was a minority view in that
few would describe "salmon as 'beautiful' or [admit] that they
stood in awe of the fish."6" Yet, he also describes a time and a
Native American perspective during which such "constructions"
(as he calls them) of salmon were the norm, rather than the
exception. Respect for salmon, indeed for all animals, is a
possible element of the human construction of animals, but, as
Scarce points out, a scientific attitude of control is incompatible
with an attitude of restraint and respect for natural processes
whereby fish define themselves.69 It is the reverse; it is
(2002) (describing the use of transgenic technology to introduce silk moth genes to
express antimicrobial peptides).
67 Scarce, Fishy Business at 148 (cited in note 63).
68 Id at 149.
69 The attitude of control and manipulation is perhaps more properly identified with
engineering/applied science than with pure science, since pure science could seek only to
understand but otherwise leave alone, while engineering has no justification for its
existence except to manipulate. However, certainly in America, and in the modern world
generally, science is largely Baconian (called so after Sir Francis Bacon, who wrote in the
1500s about science as a tool to control nature and harness her to human will, not just to
understand and admire the wonder of creation or other possible uses of science). There
are many feminist critiques of this approach and the power of science in shaping our
expectations of and beliefs about nature. See, for example, Carolyn Merchant, Radical
Ecology: the Search for a Livable World 41-63 (Routledge 2d ed 2005) (arguing that the
death of nature legitimized the dominion of western mechanistic science and capitalism
allowing for exploitable profits and manipulation); Donna Haraway, Primate Visions:
Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (Routledge 1989) (discussing
the domination of Western white male bias in evolutionary theory); Birke, Feminism,
Animals and Science (cited in note 29) ("The macho scientist does not express feelings,
may evei be cavalier in his (or her) attitudes towards ... animals [y]et both [empathy
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glorification of human processes that define and modify animals,
and such glorification cannot co-exist with respect for the beings
so modified and then defined by reference to the modification.
Scarce's example of (com)modification of salmon is
instructive and eloquent, but more frightening examples of
human control and modification of animals exist in the world of
transgenic animal research. To create a transgenic animal, a
gene that is foreign to the animal is inserted into the animal's
70genome. Transgenic animals, also known as chimeras, such as
chickens with human proteins in their eggs or goats with human
proteins in their milk, may be used to produce proteins for
human medical therapies. 71 Researchers are experimentally
producing pigs with human blood and mice with human brain
cells, on the theory that closer resemblance to humans makes for
better models through which to test drugs or to grow transplant
organs for humans. 72 That is, researchers are attempting to
make research animals more like humans so that they can
exploit animals more effectively.
If researchers lose respect for salmon when they turn
salmon into the means of producing the information through
which salmon will be controlled, what of the prospects for a
respectful attitude toward chimeras? Certainly, for a long time
humans have bred the types of cats, dogs, and livestock they
prefer. But this is a new order of control and purposeful
construction of animals. Humans' escalating technological
capacity to make wholly new animals more quickly than through
the slower mechanism of selectively breeding animals for traits
that humans value is resulting in escalating losses of respect for
the animals they exploit or "make."73 It seems that the more
"man-made" an animal, the less autonomous or "natural" the
animal, until finally it is possible to define them, socio-culturally
and legally, as mere machines for the production of human
and machismo] can coexist in science.").
70 The term "chimera" also refers to an animal (or human) who has received an organ
transplant from another animal. Rick Weiss, Of Mice, Men and In-Between; Scientists
Debate Blending OfHuman, Animal Forms, Wash Post Al (Nov 20, 2004).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 This escalation exists in striking contrast to the apparent underlying theory of the
Animal Welfare Act that uses of animals should be reduced, refined, and replaced. As
Darian M. Ibrahim points out, this escalation demonstrates that animals' advocates
should not trust the methodological imperative to reduce, refine, and replace animal
usage as a means of incremental abolition of animal exploitation for research purposes.
Darian M. Ibrahim, Reduce, Refine, Replace: The Failure of the Three R's and the Future
ofAnimal Experimentation, 2006 U Chi Legal F 195, 223-28.
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goods.74 Stewardship does not seem to be an option; domination
borne of manipulative creation of animals continues in the form
of blatant exploitation. Since most Americans do not encounter
many non-human-modified (that is, wild) animals, the idea of
"animal" is necessarily different from those times during which
humans encountered animals they had no hand in designing or
controlling.
Given this background of systematically defining animals
through the modification of their bodies and temperaments to
suit human interests, the challenge of animal advocacy appears
at times to be overwhelmingly difficult. Domestication of
animals-making animals-is the oppressive act that must be
stopped if animals are to be respected, but imagining the world
without domestication (oppression) of animals is at least as
difficult for animals' advocates as imagining the world without
oppression (domestication) of women is for feminists. As legal
scholar Catharine A. MacKinnon observes, women are oppressed
by male sexual privilege and by socio-cultural and legal practices
that use "man as the measure."75 Animals are also oppressed by
humans' forcibly acting upon the bodies of unconsenting animal
individuals, by generalized human exploitative privilege in
designing animals' bodies, and by socio-cultural and legal
practices that use "man as the measure" of what constitutes the
"good" and the "worthy."
The acts and thoughts that do violence to women and
animals (and others who do not fit the idealized version of the
"good" and the "worthy") are at the heart of oppression, and it is
for that reason that the focus should be on the oppression itself.
The focus should not be on those qualities of women or animals
74 I use the word "natural" to refer to a state of animal-ness in which humans have
not intentionally intervened in animals' seasonal subsistence and reproduction cycle,
which Noske describes as the most appropriate definition of "not domesticated" or "wild"
or "natural." Noske, Beyond Boundaries at 6 (cited in note 29).
By contrast with the view of nature defined as distinct from human intervention,
some may argue that, since humans are natural beings, anything they make or do will
also be natural, thereby eliding what they consider to be only an apparent, not real,
difference between that which is "natural" and that which is "man-made." While the
argument does illustrate the ease with which some humans can be made to feel
comfortable about what they do to animals and to the environment, the argument, if
accepted literally, would entitle humans to completely destroy the earth with impunity.
Such a literal elision would prevent discussion of topics that have normative resonance,
for example, protecting animals and protecting the environment.
75 Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 32-45 (Harvard 1987);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Of Mice and Men: A Feminist Fragment on Animal Rights, in
Sunstein and Nussbaum, eds, Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions 263,
270 (cited in note 43).
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or excluded others which, if documented, would qualify them for
entrance to the community of those worthy of respect. Advocates
should, on every occasion, turn the spotlight on exploitative,
oppressive acts and thoughts, define them for what they are-
exploitative and oppressive-and seek changes in those
assumptions, thoughts, and acts that are completely
incompatible with respect for others. The problems associated
with determining the worthiness of potential rights-holders are
so formidable and the process so slow, that resolving those
problems first in order to establish rights entitlements which
would then lead to duties should be relinquished in favor of
attacking oppressive conduct first. It is not just a faster means of
generating change (slow as it is), it is the only means of
generating the paradigmatic shift in socio-cultural and legal
definitions of those who do not fit the template of current
preferences. We must focus on the violence and oppressive
conduct itself in order to reduce violence and oppression, rather
than deciding who among those being treated violently and
oppressively is worthy of legal recourse.
II. OF ANIMAL RIGHTS (AND BACTERIA)
Differences are inequality's post hoc excuse, its conclusory
artifact, its outcome presented as its origin, the damage
that is pointed to as the justification for doing the damage
after the damage has been done, the distinctions that
perception is socially organized to notice because
inequality gives them consequences for social power ....
Difference is the velvet glove on the iron fist of
domination. This is as true when differences are affirmed
as when they are denied, when their substance is
applauded or when it is disparaged.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 8
(Harvard 1987).
Animals are treated legally as unworthy of protection from
violent and oppressive acts because they have been defined as
different from humans who, by contrast, are worthy of protection
from violent and oppressive acts. The legal entitlement to define
animals literally through research and development, as well as
socio-culturally through law, resides first in the legal status of
animals as property or potential property and second in their
lack of legal personhood. Under laissez-faire capitalist principles,
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owners of resources can exploit such resources fully as long as no
one's defined legal interests are involuntarily harmed as an
immediate consequence. 76 Exploitation is a term frequently
applied to capitalist enterprises but most often with respect to
humans exploited by their employers, rather than with regard to
animals, about whom there is no question of entitlement to
exploit. A difference between animals and workers who are
treated like resources is that workers have some de jure rights to
prevent some de facto treatment of them as resources. Animals
are treated both de jure and de facto as mere resources that can
be (ab)used or even destroyed at the owner's discretion. Animals,
having no legal interests or rights, cannot be legally harmed by
any type of exploitation. Similarly, humans who care about
animals, having no legal interests or rights in the property of
another, cannot be legally harmed by the exploitation of those
animals. Yet, actually both the animals and the humans who
care about them are horribly harmed by the exploitation of those
animals. They simply are not allowed to use the legal process to
define it for what it is to them-blatant cruelty and abuse.
Despite real differences in the exploitation of humans and
animals, reduction of privilege to exploit is crucial to systemic
reform, whether that exploitation be of humans or of animals.
Elsewhere I have written about the need for and benefits of
animals' advocates engaging in collaborative advocacy that
strikes at the root of exploitation against both workers and
animals.77  Far from diluting the advocacy for animals,
collaborative advocacy, by challenging and changing the root
source of oppressive conduct, would redound to the benefit of
humans and animals.
When advocacy is focused directly on animals and not on
systemic reduction in privilege to exploit, animals' advocates
make use of a readily accepted concept of justice: like entities
should be treated alike. The argument is that animals similar to
humans, either because they are cognitively alike or because
76 The emphasis here is on the involuntariness of animals' losses. While humans can
decide to waive or contract out of legal protections, animals' losses are always involuntary
because they have never had the right to decide for themselves what they might give up
in order to get something else. It is an essential characteristic of their status as property
that they cannot make such decisions. They have no legal interests, no legal status with
which to negotiate, and no legal voice with which to rectify those problems. As legal
"things," animals have no rights whatsoever; the full package of entitlements is held by
their owners.
77 Taimie L. Bryant, Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals, 1 J Animal L and
Ethics 63 (2006).
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they are sentient, should be treated like humans at least as to
the basic right to bodily integrity and freedom from physical and
psychological torment." Utilization of this pathway to justice
requires repeated assertions of the similarities of animals to
humans, similarities which would justify better treatment of
animals. This path is intuitively powerful to those who see the
false distinctions that society has drawn for its own convenience
and exploitative purposes.
As powerful as it is to those on the inside of the social justice
movement, however, the similarity argument loses force in
dealings with those on the outside of the movement who cannot
appreciate its moral vision and who readily manipulate
meanings of "similarity" and "justice." In response to advocates'
claim that animals are sufficiently like humans in sufficiently
significant ways that justice demands sparing them from
human-caused suffering, opponents simply redefine animals and
humans so that animals can be characterized as dissimilar
enough from humans that we need not worry about treating
them like humans.79 For instance, when scientists suggested that
fish feel pain,8" others responded that, while fish may appear to
experience pain like humans experience pain, fish do not
cognitively process pain the same way that humans do.8
Therefore, fish can be seen as different enough from humans
that the justice claim that like entities should be treated alike
can be dismissed as inapposite. Opponents of animal rights
argue that "justice" is something reserved for humans and that
humans must, by definition, be unlike animals. Once humans
are defined as "not-animal" per se, it is very difficult to invoke a
justice argument that calls for like treatment of like entities.
78 I have dealt with the similarity argument in more depth elsewhere. Taimie L.
Bryant, Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to
be Legally Protected from HumansZ 70 L & Contemp Probs (forthcoming 2006).
79 Id.
80 L.U. Sneddon, et al, Do 6ish have nociceptors: evidence for the evolution of a
vertebrate sensory system, 270 Proc Royal Socy London B: Biological Sci. 1115, 1115-21
(2003). See also Michael Stoskopf, Pain andAnalgesia in Birds, Reptiles, Amphibians and
Fish, 35(2) Investigative Ophthalmology & Visual Science 775, 775-80 (1994) ("It is
unequivocal that fish have complex nervous systems and that the reflexive responses to
painful stimuli are present.").
81 Animal Models of Pain, The Scientist (Mar 28, 2005), available at <http://www.the-
scientist.com/2005/03/28/S10/l#top> (last visited Apr 2, 2006). See also William
Timberlake, The Attribution of Suffering, in Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum,
eds, Animal Experimentation: The Moral Issues 76 (Prometheus 1991) ("Both animal
rights advocates and scientists want to reduce the suffering of others, but this cannot be
done in any reasonable way until we agree on its nature, extent, and relative value.").
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While both animals' advocates and institutional exploiters of
animals duel over definitions of animals, no one questions the
rationale for harming animals. For example, no one is examining
the motives of individuals who want to induce pain in fish or kill
peafowl on the Palos Verdes Peninsula. Even in an apparently
animal-friendly city with a wild bird protection ordinance,
someone who wants to kill peafowl remains completely free of
obligation to justify his or her preference. Why shouldn't the
focus be on those who harm animals rather than on cramming
animals into terminological boxes on the theory that doing so is
the only way to secure protection for them?
In pursuing rights for animals based on the similarity
argument, animals' advocates are using a historically important
avenue for securing rights in this country. Indeed, duties without
rights, or as a precursor to rights, is an alien concept here. To
whom would an individual owe duties if animals do not even
have a legal identity? Rights are the basis for individuation and
legal identity, not just the basis of technical requirements, such
as standing to speak in a court of law. Moreover, if duties are
framed generally-"no harm to animals is allowed"-what of
bacteria? Must we not wash our hands? Are bacteria "animals"
for purposes of the prohibition on harm to animals? In order to
figure out whether we can wash our hands, very quickly we have
circled into a world of definitions of animals and of bacteria, and
very quickly those definitions revolve around human interests in
doing, unimpeded, exactly what humans would like to do.
Most animals' advocates respond by defining "animals" as
sentient in ways that distinguish them from bacteria and make
it easy to wash our hands but difficult to eat chickens. In other
words, they would engage in the same line-drawing exercise as
animal exploiters, only drawing the line at a different point, one
that would include some animals as protected individuals. This
is inadequate. For one thing, sustaining life on this planet-
sustaining the lives of animals as well as humans and plants-
requires sustaining all different kinds of life, including
bacteria.82 Deciding that bacteria are not sentient does not tell us
82 Maria Cone, Threat Seen From Antibacterial Soap Chemicals, LA Times A17 (May
10, 2006) (reporting research that suggests potential harm from large amounts of
antibacterial chemicals in waterways and deposited on agricultural fields). For research
on the threat to humans of indiscriminate use of antibiotics see John J. Cebra, Influences
ofmicrobiota on intestinal immune system development, 69 Am J Clin Nutr 1046S (1999)
(finding that commensal bacteria in the gastrointestinal tract effect development of the
immune system); Katarina Chiller, et al, Skin Microflora and Bacterial Infections of the
Skin, 6 J Investigative Dermatological Symposium Proc 170 (2001) (finding that
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anything about how to sustain a world in which bacteria are part
of the fabric that constitutes "life." It does not tell us anything
about how to wash our hands so that we cause the least amount
of damage to that fabric of life while reasonably protecting our
own health.
In terms of animal advocacy specifically, the line-drawing
exercise in which animals' advocates typically engage excludes
the means by which animals survive in the world. If sentience or
self-consciousness is the dividing line between those who receive
protection and those who do not, then we will be excluding a vast
number of beings whose existence is completely intertwined with
those on the other side of the line we have drawn. Science, and
scientific delays in our ability to understand animals, makes that
line arbitrary. Animals' real and urgent needs make that line
nonsensical by any measure of actually assisting animals other
than the most basic assistance to some small number of animals:
protecting those animals known to feel pain from torture at
human hands.
The standard of current line-drawing, requiring human
types of consciousness or cognition, is completely (and
arrogantly) human-centric. Advocates may argue that it is
necessary in order to convince decisionmakers to remove some of
the entitlements currently held by animal (ab)users, but such a
pathway fails in some significant ways. Even if people can be
persuaded that some animals have some rights, there is no
guarantee that those rights will not themselves be limited. It is
curious that Stone is so emphatic about the need to establish
rights when he himself acknowledges that even human rights
are subject to limitation and abrogation-even the most basic of
rights, the right to live. When it comes to rights for nonhuman
entities, the limitations are even more severe:
Now to say that the natural environment should have
rights is not to say anything as silly as that no one should
be allowed to cut down a tree. We say human beings have
rights, but ... they can be executed. Corporations have
rights, but they cannot plead the fifth amendment; In re
Gault gave 15-year-olds certain rights in juvenile
proceedings, but it did not give them the right to vote.
commensal bacteria on the skin protect against pathogens); Richard Weller, Nitric Oxide
is Generated on the Skin Surface by Reduction of Sweat Nitrate, 107 J Investigative
Dermatology 327 (1996) (finding that commensal bacteria convert nitrite in sweat to
nitrogen oxide, which may affect blood flow in the skin and protect against pathogens).
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Thus, to say that the environment should have rights is
not to say that it should have every right we can imagine,
or even the same body of rights as human beings have.
Nor is it to say that everything in the environment should
have the same rights as every other thing in the
environment.
One wonders exactly what it would mean to establish rights
for animals or for aspects of the environment. It is extremely
important to ask this question because simply freeing animals
from their legal status as the property of humans will not give
them affirmative rights to protect themselves. If in answering
the question of "which rights?" the rights of animals will be
defined by comparative reference to other rights-holders, it is
doubtful that there will be much substantive protection. In other
words, establishing the concept of rights as a general matter
does not do enough of the work of protecting animals (or the
environment) that we can predict with any degree of comfort or
certainty how we could resolve basic conflicts between humans
and animals regarding rights in those aspects of the
environment each defines as necessary for their way of life.
The line-drawing exercise that makes some animals worthy
of rights (in other words, respectable) on the basis of how closely
they approximate certain human characteristics is a calculation
based on scientific results produced by scientists, who have an
interest in continued privilege to use animals as they choose. The
similarity argument fails animals because it does not generate
respect for the wondrous diversity of life that animals contain
and represent. For example, even if scientists were engaged
simply in figuring out whether animals' characteristics
approximate those of humans and animals' advocates were
pointing to scientists' agenda-neutral discoveries of similarities
in order to justify inclusion of animals in the community of
rights-holders, what of animals' abilities that humans will never
approximate-the ability to fly or to remain under water,
completely unassisted by technological devices? What is more
wondrous about our cognitive capacities than about animals'
completely different cognitive capacities? The very significance of
animals-the diversity they contain at the individual and
collective levels-is lost in a paradigm that requires their
83 Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?at 10-11 (cited in note 57).
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categorization by reference to the qualities by which humans
define themselves.
It is simply raw power, not justice, that makes humans the
center of value and definition. Just as MacKinnon has argued
that women should not be defined by, or be defining themselves
by, reference to the achievements and desires of men, animals
should not be defined by the abilities and preferences of
humans.' The world is a less awe-inspiring, less rich, less
tolerant place when humans are the measure of all beings. Our
advocacy method should embed the characteristics that will
sustain respect beyond simply relieving animals from the
torment of raw exploitation in flesh-food production facilities and
laboratories. Yet the paradigm of justice currently deployed-
that "like entities should be treated alike"-forces a comparison
that leaves out those qualities of animals that are unlike
humans but which nevertheless provide additional bases for
respecting them.
But what of bacteria? And what of microalgae? And what of
animals who are not "sentient"? Because we lack a socio-cultural
basis for valuing life in forms other than the form humans take,
it is difficult to value them and even more difficult to envision a
world that accommodates them. Advocates for animal rights may
well be reluctant to defend rights for bacteria and microalgae
because they are certainly different from humans, we have no
means of valuing their lives, and it seems literally incredible
that anyone would defend them. Herein lies the crux of the
problem with rights and the need for an alternative means of
helping animals: it is absolutely imperative to protect all life, but
seeking rights entitlements cannot accomplish that as long as
rights are available only to those who are like humans. The
extent of the problem and the need to resolve it through novel
means are illustrated by the following LA Times description of
coral and the "bleaching" of coral:
8 Consider MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (cited in note 75). In her essay Of
Mice and Men, MacKinnon argues that animals should not be defined by reference to
"man as the measure" either. She illustrates the oppressive impact of humans on animals
by reference to how the law treats humans' sexual conduct with animals. Human
oppressive impact is far more dramatic and deep than such examples illustrate, however.
We literally use the bodies of animals against the animals themselves in order to
domesticate and exploit them. As MacKinnon notes, despite the lack of necessity to
consume animals, we persist in making our bodies out of their bodies, in making their
reduced-to-inanimate selves into our animate selves. That process will not allow for an
identity in animals other than their uses to humans who literally consume them.
MacKinnon, Of Mice and Men at 270 (cited in note 43).
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Corals are sensitive animals that require clean, clear
water that is warm-but not too warm. In recent decades,
clouding from excess sediment, fertilizer, sewage and
other pollutants has taken a toll, while overfishing has
removed many of the fish that graze algae off reefs and
keep them clean.
The Caribbean is known for the fascinating shapes, colors
and odd features of its many corals. About 80% of the
reefs there have been lost in the last three decades....
"We now may be witnessing the rapid loss of [much] of
what remains. ."5
... Coral reefs are the composite of millions of tiny
animals, called polyps, that build hard exoskeletons of
calcium carbonate. These skeletons fuse together in
exquisite patterns....
A coral polyp thrives by absorbing micro-algae and
sheltering it in its skeleton. The algae, in turn, produce
sugars that the corals use as food. This symbiotic
relationship fails when ocean water gets too warm and
the algae leave or are ejected. The polyp then withers,
leaving only a ghostly white skeleton that looks as if it
had been bleached.
Reefs can recover from bleaching over several decades if
they are colonized by larvae from undamaged corals
nearby. But repeated stresses from warming and other
environmental assaults can permanently kill corals,
including colonies that can live hundreds of years. '
None of the creatures mentioned in this description of death
and destruction are apparently sentient or self-conscious. None
would be protected under a rule of "no harm to animals" in which
the definition of animals included only those with sentience or
self-consciousness. And why should we protect them? For our
own ends in saving the planet itself from further human-caused
destruction? Because other animals are dependent on conditions
also enjoyed by the coral? Because the coral themselves are
inherently valuable? The question should not be whether coral
85 Kenneth R. Weiss and Usha Lee McFarling, Warm Oceans Threaten Caribbean
Coral Reefs, LA Times A16 (Oct 25, 2005) (quoting Nancy Knowlton, a coral reef expert
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deserve protection; the question should be whether humans
deserve to act in ways that violate the very requisites of life for
other beings.
Perhaps some would argue that, while the collective death of
individual microalgae and coral polyps is meaningful, the
individual deaths of micro-algae and coral polyps are not.
Perhaps, the argument may continue, environmental law should
be the vehicle through which we protect collectivities of
nonsentient animals who serve the interests of sentient animals.
There are many falsely sharp distinctions embedded in such a
view. Just as the distinction between cognition and sentience as
a basis for animals' similarity to humans falsely views cognition
and sentience as separate qualities, the distinction between
nonsentient and sentient animals is too sharply drawn. The
distinction between the individual and the collective has
similarly little value because of the tremendous overlap between
an individual and all the collectivities through which he or she
lives and defines his or her self; each is necessary to the other.
These distinctions are made to buttress conclusions upon which
discriminatory action can be founded. As MacKinnon has noted
with respect to women, "[d]ifferences are inequality's post hoc
excuse.""' Because it serves human interests to treat animals
without respect, differences can be identified to support that
treatment.
Environmental law need not be, but often is, similarly blind
to the uniqueness and value of animals. Environmental law may
value animals as "units of biodiversity," but individual animals
may well not be valued at all under existent environmental legal
paradigms and proposals. So, for example, many
environmentalists may not be particularly troubled by the
wholesale killing of feral pigs on California's Channel Islands in
order to restore the indigenous ecosystem, even when humane
population reduction methods exist.88  Nor do many
87 MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified at 8 (cited in note 75).
88 The plan calling for hiring a hunting contractor to eradicate feral pigs also
contains plans for changing the populations of other species of animals on the Islands,
primarily to save the island fox. Part of the reason for drastic action appears to be that
the situation worsened to the point that the Nature Conservancy and the National Park
Service deem it an emergency that warrants draconian action. National Park Service,
Santa Cruz Island-Plan for Recovery, available at
<http'//www.nps.gov/chis/restoringsci/PDFs/FINAL%20Plan%20for%20Recovery.pdf>
(last visited Dec 16, 2005). On the other hand, an "emergency" situation may mean
nothing other than that there has been a decision to act quickly without regard for
humane methods. This is the argument behind a lawsuit to stop the killing of feral pigs.
See Greg Risling, Lawsuit Seeks to Stop Eradication of Pigs on Santa Cruz Island, AP
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environmentalists seem to consider that testing environmental
toxins on animals raises ethical problems in our relationship to
those animals. In other words, viewing animals as collectivities
and as units of biodiversity is only marginally more respectful of
other life than is viewing animals as units of consumption. The
only protection inherent in such an approach is protection from
extinction as a species. That is why the Endangered Species Act89
("ESA"), despite protecting a broad array of animals and plants
through prohibitions on "taking" them and precautionary
analysis of impacts on habitat,0 is quite limited in what it can
accomplish for individual animals. Nevertheless, the ESA does
contain preconditions for animal rights, such as species
protection and protection of habitat. Enforcing the ESA keeps
animals alive long enough and keeps their environment intact
enough that they stand a chance of one day acquiring de facto
rights of self-determination by way of duties imposed on humans.
(July 6, 2005), available at <httpJ/www.mercurynews.com/mld/mercurynews/news/
Iocal/states/california/northerncalifornia/12068603.htm?template=contentModules/print
story.jsp> (last visited Jan 21, 2006). Moreover, the decision to protect the island fox at
the expense of other animals may seem to signal respect for animals, but it may also
simply signal humans' preferences for a particular animal or a particular ecosystem.
89 16 USC § 1531 et seq (2005).
90 Some subscribe to a generalized "precautionary" approach by which risk of harm to
the environment would supplant cost-benefit analyses that assume some harm but
include counterbalancing benefits in deciding whether to go forward. The "precautionary
principle" holds ideological promise, but it is controversial. For descriptions of the
principle, see, for example, Ken Geiser, Establishing a General Duty of Precaution in
Environmental Protection Policies in the United States, in Carolyn Raffensperger and
Joel A. Tickner, eds, Protecting Public Health & the Environment. Implementing the
Precautionary Principle, xxi, xxiii (Island 1999) ("[P]arties should take measures to
protect the health of the environment, even in the absence of clear, scientific evidence of
harm."). See also John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 Wm
& Mary Envtl L & Poly Rev 13, 13 (2002) ("[The precautionary principle] reflects the
implicit judgment that, in the absence of some degree of ex ante regulatory review, new
technologies will create novel, severe, and irreversible-but avoidable-harms to human
health and the environment."); David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the
Precautionary Principle, 97 Nw U L Rev 1315, 1315 (2003) ("In most formulations, the
principle entails shifting the burden of proof to proponents of regulatory inaction in the
face of health or environmental risk ... ."). There are many critics of the precautionary
principle. Cass Sunstein, among others, strongly criticizes the precautionary principle for
its potential to paralyze decisionmaking with uncertainty about regulatory inaction or
action because the threshold for risk and action is not defined. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Precautionary Principle, 151 U Pa L Rev 1003, 1003 (2003). See also Frank Cross,
Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 Wash & Lee L Rev 851, 862-908
(1996) (discussing how regulations based on the precautionary principle can perversely
cause a net detriment to public health or the environment by restricting potentially risky
products or practices, preventing the benefits of their use, and thus producing worse
harms than the risks or harms avoided). Sunstein regards the precautionary principle as
a 'crude way of protecting.. . goals, which should be pursued directly." Sunstein, 151 U
Pa L Rev at 1005.
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Simply creating the preconditions for life does not
necessarily insure the development of respect for life. The
perspective of respect for life (and restraint in manipulating it)
that accompanies an ideology of individuation and identity,
currently housed in the concept of individual rights, should
underlie our efforts to save coral and the lives that are
intertwined with theirs. If not, we may well cavalierly substitute
other lives for these lives, with a resultant loss of respect for
"life" itself and the true diversity of life, diversity that exists at
the level of individuals. For example, the same LA Times article
reflects its author's hope for the discovery of a heat-tolerant
strain of microalgae in the Indian Ocean, which, if transplanted
to waters becoming increasingly warmer, may help to preserve
coral in those areas. While it may help in meeting the human
goal of having coral reefs, such a method substitutes lives for
lives as though they are of equal value and as though the activity
of substitution is harmless. In fact, cavalier human action could
cause the irretrievable loss of heat-intolerant microalgae.
Humans do not appreciate the lives of microalgae, since our only
measure of microalgae is our own qualities. So we don't really
know what the loss is. Even if we don't know what the loss is or
worry about that type of loss, this does not mean that there has
been no loss as an objective matter. This is as true of individual
microalgae as it is of collectivities of heat-intolerant microalgae.
While humans cannot prevent all human-caused losses of
other lives, we could certainly improve the loss rate by focusing
on those of our acts that cause losses. We don't significantly
reduce the loss-rate by privileging only a very small assortment
of animals who happen to have the capacities to think or to feel
as we do. We don't do much to improve respect for life or specific
other lives through that avenue, either. It is not only "losses"
that we should be guarding against. We should also be guarding
against the oppressive acting out of our desires upon the earth
and its inhabitants. The focus should be on establishing duties
on humans not to behave in arrogantly oppressive ways rather
than on defining animals as worthy or not of protection from
human's destructive acts. Arguing about whether a particular
type of animal deserves protection from humans leaves
unexplored and intact the presumption that violent, oppressive
conduct is appropriate unless and until a particular animal or
entity is removed from the category of "okay to exploit."
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III. ESTABLISHING DUTIES TOWARDS ANIMALS
The goal of this dissident approach is not to make legal
categories trace and trap the way things are. It is not to
make rules that fit reality. It is critical of reality. Its task
is not to formulate abstract standards that will produce
determinate outcomes in particular cases. Its project is
more substantive, more jurisprudential than formulaic,
which is why it is difficult for the mainstream discourse to
dignify it as an approach to doctrine or to imagine it as a
rule of law at all.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 40
(Harvard 1987).
The goal of my approach is to stop categorizing animals by
reference to whether they are worthy of protection and to
encourage reduction in human entitlements to act in oppressive
ways. Since the world as a whole is necessary, breaking the
world into discrete elements that will or will not be protected
misses the point of interrelationship and, once habitats have
been destroyed, obviates the possibility of self-determination.
Conservation biologist Paul McGuire, quoted earlier for his
minority view of respect for salmon, recognizes that we will have
done little for the salmon if we do not protect the rivers in which
they swim, breathe, eat, and reproduce.
I feel so saddened when I see the state of our rivers. The
Columbia River is such a great example of what we've
done to the tremendous stock of salmon that ran through
that river, the genetic variability that existed there pre-
1920s, 1930s.9'
In fact, water is at the heart of protecting many different
species of fish, setting in motion complex considerations for
water usage. Governor Schweitzer of Montana raised the issue of
the Columbia River basin in connection not just with salmon in
Washington and Oregon but also with respect to endangered
species of fish in Montana:
[Endangered Species Act issues] are complicated issues.
Let me give you another example. Here in Montana, we
have a couple more endangered species-fish-the white
sturgeon and the bull trout, and they are living in the
91 Scarce, Fishy Business at 148-49 (cited in note 63).
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streams that are upriver from the Columbia River basin.
Now, in the Columbia River basin they have a Cohoe and
a Chinook salmon that is endangered. Now, Washington
and Oregon, to protect their endangered species, they
would like us to draw down on our reservoirs at such a
time that more water can be placed for the Cohoe and the
Chinook. Unfortunately, that would further endanger our
white sturgeon and bull trout. So, while we're trying to
protect our species, they're trying to protect their species,
and in many cases protecting our habitat, is 180 degrees
from their species. These are interrelated issues. They're
very complicated, and so there's winners and losers, I
understand that.92
The losers are usually the rivers and fish themselves, with
humans rarely losing out on rights to use the rivers as they
choose. The perspective of harms to the rivers and to the fish
usually is missing from debates that occur in the context of
policy and legal decisions that affect them. When perspectives
are perceived to be missing, there is a strong inclination to look
for those whose voices would add those perspectives. Therein lies
an impetus for advocacy to include the "voices" of rivers and fish.
Yet, as rights-less entities, rivers and fish are legally visible only
as the objects of human interests in using them. Proponents of
rights for rivers and fish are few in number, for good reason. As
Stone noted in Should Trees Have Standing, "[T]o urge a court
that an endangered river is 'a person' ... will call for lawyers as
bold and imaginative as those who convinced the Supreme Court
that a railroad corporation was a 'person' under the fourteenth
amendment, a constitutional provision theretofore generally
thought of as designed to secure the rights of freedmen."93 Stone
calls for just such imagination and boldness because rights seem
indispensable. Rights may well be indispensable, but getting to
rights directly is fraught with difficulty. That is why I argue
later in this Article that the pursuit of rights must inform the
creation of duties on humans to end exploitative privilege but
that establishing duties can and should precede the
establishment of rights.
92 KPCC 89.3 Los Angeles Radio Broadcast, Airtalk with Larry Mantle: Endangered
Species Act Reform (July 12, 2005), available at <http'//www.scpr.org/
programs/airtalkflistings/2005/07/airtalk_20050711.shtm> (last visited Dec 16, 2005).
93 Stone, Should Trees Have Standingat 18 (cited in note 57).
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At the forefront of establishing legal rights for animals,
Francione notes that the legal situation of animals is
particularly severe because animals not only do not have rights,
they are relegated to a legal status that precludes rights;
animals are legally the property (or potential property) of
humans.94 In seeking to remove that legal status, Francione
suggests incremental establishment of animals' right to be free
from human exploitative practices, the basic right to not be the
property of another.95 Francione argues persuasively that simply
being nicer to animals by way of humane adjustments in the
husbandry standards required of owners of personal property
animals will not reflect or create the respect that is owed to
animals, especially to those animals who, like humans, are
sentient. Rather, it will make exploitation more palatable.96
Philosopher Mary Midgley also notes the indispensability of
moral (if not legal) rights when she writes, "'Animal rights' may
be hard to formulate, as indeed are the rights of humans. But 'no
rights' will not do."97 This is because, "[w]here the realm of right
and duty stops, there, to ordinary thinking, begins the realm of
the optional."98 Stone makes the same point when he argues that
only rights-holding by non-humans (such as rivers, trees, and
animals) will result in serious consideration of harms to those
non-humans that result from human action and inaction.99 As it
is now, disputes between humans, such as those between
upstream and downstream riparian rights holders, may not be
addressed at all if the costs of addressing them are too great. 00
And, even when humans decide that it is worthwhile to address
their own harms, harms to the river itself and to the animals
dependent upon the river are not considered. According to Stone,
94 Francione, Animals, Property, and the Law at 15-32 (cited in note 51).
95 In his book Rain Without Thunder, Francione sets out criteria of incremental
reform that could lead to rights for animals. Those include the requirements that any
specific proposed reform prohibit an act or acts of exploitation that go to the heart of the
exploitative enterprise and to the heart of animals' basic needs, without substituting
another form of exploitation in its place. Francione, Rain Without Thunder at 190-219
(cited in note 28).
96 Francione argues that such legal welfarist approaches are not just ineffective, they
actually impede the development of animal rights. Francione, Introduction to Animal
Rights at 54-80 (cited in note 51); Francione, Rain Without Thunder at 47-146 (cited in
note 28).
97 Mary Midgley, Duties Concerning Islands, in Robert Elliot and Arran Gare, eds,
Environmental Philosophy: A Collection ofReadings 166, 171 (Penn State 1983).
98 Id.
9 Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?at 26-28 (cited in note 57).
100 Id at 15.
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only rights-holding can prevent many of the human interest
centered trade-offs that leave aspects of the environment totally
out of the picture when injunctions or damages are sought for
harms that include harms to the environment. '0 '
Stone writes of legal-operational aspects of according rights
to aspects of the environment, but he also makes the same point
as Midgley when he writes that the psychic and socio-psychic
aspects of radically reconceiving our relationship to the rest of
nature cannot occur without establishing rights for currently
legally invisible aspects of the environment.102 An entity's
"rights" establish normative boundaries for others' conduct, even
when those rights are imperfectly protected in courts of law.
That is, we take seriously those, and only those, who have rights.
These are not the only scholars who have observed that,
theoretically, rights could be established in nonhuman entities
and aspects of nature on the grounds that there is inherent value
in nature. 10 3 If one takes a positive view of legal rights as a
means by which our society accomplishes goals, there is no
reason that we could not entitle rivers, trees, blades of grass, or
animals to rights.0 4 Indeed, in his criticism of granting legal
rights to animals on the basis of sentience or cognitive ability,
Richard A. Posner has argued that legal rights are not
established because of qualities in the entities in which they are
established; they are established because of what can be
accomplished as a result of rights entitlements. 15
Despite the theoretical feasibility of establishing rights for
any entity we choose, it is clear that, as a society, we choose very
seldom to establish legal rights for formerly right-less entities
because legal rights are correlative with legal duties with which
most of us do not want to comply. Perhaps that is why the
establishment of moral rights seems more easily to precede than
to follow the establishment of legal rights and why law is
'01 Id at 26-28.
102 Id at 49-54.
103 Consider Nicholas Agar, Life's Intrinsic Value: Science, Ethics, and Nature
(Columbia 2001).
104 Nagire Naffine characterizes this stance as one in which a "legal person" is defined
by reference to the ends served by defining an entity as a "legal person." Naffine, 66 Mod
L Rev 346 (cited in note 55).
105 Richard A. Posner, Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic
Perspectives, in Sunstein and Nussbaum, eds, Animal R'ghts: Current Debates and New
Directions 51, 57-58 (cited in note 43). This is not to say that Posner thinks that animals
should have rights; it is only to say that he is not persuaded by arguments that certain
animals should have rights because of qualities they display.
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sometimes out of synchrony with current views of morality.
There is particularly serious political difficulty in establishing
rights for animals and for aspects of the environment. Although
many people care about the environment and about animals,
neither the environment nor animals constitute voting
constituencies on their own. Besides political difficulty, people
are heavily invested in using animals and the environment to
advance their interests in an ever-expanding consumption-
oriented lifestyle. Adequately protecting animals and the
environment would require a radical restructuring of human
"needs" and "preferences," most of which are currently taken for
granted and considered nonnegotiable requisites of a "good" life.
In addition to these formidable obstacles, there are two
major socio-legal impediments to establishing rights for animals
or elements of the environment. One is this society's
preoccupation with a contract-based model of rights and duties
as reciprocal arrangements between those individuals who have
rights and those individuals who have duties that correspond to
those rights."' The model requires symmetry between those who
have and enforce rights and those who have duties based on
those rights. I emphasize individuals because individualism is so
central to the workings and legitimacy of a contractual model of
rights; rights are appropriate only for those who can identify for
themselves what their needs are, articulate entitlements that
protect those needs, and have the wherewithal to extract the
duties that are owed to them as a result of those rights. 07
Individualism as a foundational principle acts as a double-
edged sword in a contractual model. It is the basis for respect for
106 The concept of reciprocal rights and duties is a constant in legal discourse. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld's conceptualization of the linkage has been particularly important to
theoretical understandings of the relationship between rights and duties. Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied (Yale 1966).
This may be a Western preoccupation and not a necessary feature of legal systems
as evidenced by the number of legal systems in which duties exist independently of rights
or in which rights are disfavored altogether. See, for example, Randall P. Peerenboom,
Rights, Interests, and the Interest in Rights in China, 31 Stan J Intl L 359, 367 (1995)
("[T]he Chinese conception of rights as interests to be balanced more readily lends itself
to the view that rights are not something one originally and inalienably possesses but
rather are granted by authorities [as suits those authorities' purposes].").
107 To defend one's rights, one must be a "legal person." Ngaire Naffine, who surveyed
the types of "legal persons" in evidence in jurisprudential reasoning, considers this to be
the most exclusive of all conceptions because the entities that can be legal persons under
this conception are more limited than in other conceptions. While Naffine does not
estimate the empirical frequency of the different jurisprudential types she describes, she
does note that this is the conception of "legal person" that generates the most criticism
from feminists and others who represent those excluded by the model. Naffine, 66 Mod L
Rev 346 (cited in note 55).
137]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
individuals, but it is also the basis for expectations that
individuals be able to identify their own interests and press
those interests forward.' That rights are associated with active
assertion of interests, and not just protection from harm, is
illustrated by political scientist Tim Luke's question, "Will we
allow anthrax or cholera microbes to attain self-realization in
wiping out sheep herds or human kindergartens?" 109 For those
theorists for whom the model calls for parity among rights-
holders as to entitlements to advance one's interests, not just
parity in protection from harm, the contractual model of rights
and justice seems inapposite to animals and aspects of the
environment.
At its heart, this contractual model is the basis of the second
major impediment to establishing rights for aspects of the
environment: predominance of a model of justice that requires
"like entities to be treated alike." Would-be rights-holders must
prove that they are sufficiently like current rights-holders in
ways that relate directly to the rights they argue justice
demands. As to women, feminists initially used this paradigm to
argue that, since women are like men in all aspects relevant to
work, women should be treated like men with respect to access to
work. Analogously, the idea that justice is based on like
treatment of like entities has been the source of pressure on
advocates to define animals as sufficiently "like humans" to be
entitled to basic rights."10 Advocates argue that since some
108 This is why even though individualism and individual rights are praiseworthy,
they carry particular burdens for those who are not defined as individuals or rights-
holders. See, for example, Mary Midgley's description of "icy" individualism, despite her
praise for respect for the individual and for moral rights to be held by individuals.
Midgley, Duties ConcerningIslands at 180 (cited in note 97).
109 Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: Amezican Culture, The Discourse of Species, and
Posthumanist Theory26 (Chicago 2003) (quoting Tim Luke).
110 Gary L. Francione suggests adopting the definition of a basic right developed by
political theorist Henry Shue, who:
maintains that a basic right is not a right that is "more valuable or intrinsically
more satisfying to enjoy than some other rights." Rather, a right is basic if "any
attempt to enjoy any other right by sacrificing the basic right would be quite literally
self-defeating, cutting the ground from beneath itself." Shue states that "non-basic
rights may be sacrificed, if necessary, in order to secure the basic right. But the
protection of a basic right may not be sacrificed in order to secure the enjoyment of a
non-basic right." The reason for this is that a basic right "cannot be sacrificed
successfully. If the right sacrificed is indeed basic, then no right for which it might be
sacrificed can actually be enjoyed in the absence of the basic right. The sacrifice
would have proven self-defeating."
Francione, Introduction to Animal Rights at 94 (cited in note 51) (citations omitted).
While Francione points to "basic right to physical security" as the most important of the
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animals have the capacity to think or to suffer as do humans,
animals should be treated like humans as to basic protection
from human-caused suffering. Elsewhere I have criticized the
use of the similarity argument and the paradigm of justice upon
which it is based."' In this particular context, it is important to
note only that this paradigm of justice (and the similarity
argument it requires) reinforces a contractual model of rights
and duties that admits only of symmetrical relationships
between rights-holders and duty-holders in which rights and
duties correlate closely with each. One has rights because
someone else has duties tightly linked to those rights, and one
has duties because someone else has rights tightly linked to
those duties.
A contractual model of reciprocal, correlative rights and
duties presents difficulties for all but the most able-bodied,
educated, moneyed, and articulate of humans. Many humans (let
alone animals and aspects of the environment upon which they
depend) do not "contract" or "protect themselves" in the way that
we envision for the purpose of establishing or protecting legal
rights."2 Midgley claims that despite the fact that many of the
entities to whom we feel emotionally and morally committed are
outside this realm of contractual rights and duties, our concept of
justice and rights entitlements are premised on those abilities to
articulate and to defend one's position."' Indeed, according to
Midgley, most everything and everyone we value is excluded
from the strictures of a contract model of justice, despite the
great pervasiveness of talk of "justice" as an overarching socio-
basic rights identified by Shue, by a "basic right" Francione also means the right not to be
the property of another. Id at 95.
111 Bryant, 70 L & Contemp Probs (cited in note 78).
112 This has led to considerable debate about exceptions to the model's requirements
of autonomous, individual rights-holding. Animal rights advocates engage in that debate,
called "the argument from marginal cases," because, if marginal cases of humans can be
included in the model, then animals perceived to be at the margins, also, should be
included. According to one observer of the animal rights movement, this is "probably the
most debated issue in the literature." Robert Garner, Animals, Politics, and Morality 14
(Manchester 1993). Perhaps the reason it is so debated is that it is the rendition of the
similarity argument that spells out and seeks an answer to the uncomfortable question of
treating animals so badly when they have qualities equal to or superior to the qualities of
some humans. For a review and consideration of various positions on the question,
consider Daniel A. Dombrowski, Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases
(Illinois 1997). More recently, philosopher Jeff McMahan takes on this problem of
"marginal cases" in the specific context of killing, by considering a variety of factors that
affect decisions to actively or passively kill individuals, including animals, humans in
vegetative states, and anencephalic infants. Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing:
Problems at the Margins of Life 203-28 (Oxford 2002).
".. Midgley, Duties Concerning Islands at 172-74 (cited in note 97).
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legal value. Midgley identifies a large list of entities inscribed
with moral value and worth, which, nevertheless, fall outside the
boundaries of a contractual model and so are currently ineligible
for rights.' Midgley's list of entities to whom humans exhibit
feelings of duty includes nineteen enumerated categories such as
humans who are unable to speak for themselves, future
generations," 5  nonsentient as well as sentient animals,
inanimate entities such as works of art and aspects of the
environment, comprehensive categories such as families,
ecosystems, and countries, and also entities such as "oneself" and
"God.""6 The list readily eclipses the relatively short list of those
who can have rights by virtue of falling within the boundaries of
a contract-based model of correlative rights and duties in which
they are fully able to identify and articulate their own needs and
preferences. Although Midgley does not directly ask this
question, the question exists: If "justice" is based on a conceptual
model of correlative rights and duties, but there are so many
normative duties for which rights-holders do not symmetrically
exist, then what is "justice" actually in this society? It would
seem that it is reserved for and operable among only a very few
of those to whom and with whom we actually have moral
commitments. And, when legal justice is reserved for only a few
of those to whom moral justice is owed, a gap opens between law
and morality. That gap is serious to the extent that people
believe that there should be a close connection between law and
morality.
If law is to have meaning in capturing the moral value
ascribed to those who do not meet the requirements of such a
narrow contractual model, we must do something about the
contractual model of justice and rights as strictly correlative
with duties. Such a model is not inevitable. Asian, South African,
East Indian, and Native Canadian legal systems, to name a few,
have provided for duties without corresponding rights
established in individuals," 7 even though establishing rights for
114 Id at 174.
115 Id. I am reading Midgley's category "posterity" as "future generations," although
perhaps Midgley means something different by the term. She does not define her term
explicitly; she may, however, be alluding to Grice's list of entities lacking natural rights.
Id at 167.
116 Midgley, Duties Concerning Islands at 174 (cited in note 97).
117 See, for example, Randall Peerenboom, China's Long March toward Rule of Law
513-546 (Cambridge 2002) (distinguishing between rights-based democracies and other
forms of democracies to argue that China is unlikely to develop the type of rights-based
democracy of the West); Tara Chand, The individual in the legal and political thought
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individuals who would benefit from duty-compliance might have
been a good way to enforce duties. 118 Even if ease of enforcing
duties is recognized as a possible benefit of establishing rights
correlative with duties, the individualism that underlies the
expectation that beneficiaries would enforce their rights may be
undesirable in the overall socio-cultural context of the society.
The point is that a correlative rights/duties legal model need not
exist, and it may not exist for socially-defined "good" reasons.
If we cannot do away with the correlative rights/duties
model altogether because the American legal system is too
deeply invested in it or because we value the norms that are
linked to it, advocates must at the very least think about the
possibility of reversing the order of the current attempt to create
legal rights first, followed by the development of corresponding
duties. If duties are first established to include and to protect
others we value but for whom our previous model has made no
room, perhaps at least normative rights (not just normative
concern for animals) will be derivative from those duties.
Explicitly legal rights may ultimately result from such normative
rights, effectively eroding the property status of animals. The
key to such a progression would be to avoid the creation of duties
that simply reinforce the commodification and exploitation of
animals by causing their captors to be nicer to them.
and institutions of India, in Charles A. Moore, ed, The Status of the Individual in East
and West 411 (1968) (discussing the philosophical and legal implications of Indian
individuals being embedded in groups to which the individual has duties but not rights);
Kawashima Takeyoshi, The status of the individual in the notion ofilaw, right, and social
order in Japan, in Moore, ed, The Status of the Individual in East and West at 429, 431
("[The Japanese] consider it improper for the [beneficiary] of an obligation to demand or
claim that the obligated person fulfill his obligation... there is no place for the existence
of the notion of 'right'... ."). Western legal concepts of rights may well come into conflict
with ideas held by indigenous people. See, for example, Menno Boldt, Surviving as
Indians: The Challenge of Self-Government 155 (Toronto 1993) ("Are Indians morally
obligated to adopt the Western-liberal doctrine of individual rights, as embodied in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as their standard for protection of human
dignity?"). Also, in the human rights context, see generally, Ben Saul, In the Shadow of
Human Rights: Human Duties, Obhligations, and Responsibilities, 32 Colum Hum Rts L
Rev 565 (2001). Saul notes that "[N]ot all rights and duties are correlative. If all rights
had correlative duties, there would be no need for a separate rights language." Id at 586-
87. Saul also refers to the 1981 African Charter on Human and People's Rights as
"recogniz[ing] duties of an individual towards his family and society, the State and other
legally recognized communities and the international community," and states that the
Charter "goes radically beyond the conventional notion that duties are correlative to
rights." Id at 591-92.
1'8 For example, if duties to provide for children of lawful unions are established in
parents but rights to enforce those duties are not established in children or their
guardians, then enforcement is up to the state or to a state designee, which is arguably
less efficient than establishing rights directly in those who are the intended beneficiaries
of the duties.
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Although Midgley does not do so explicitly, a logical
extension of her arguments concludes that imposition of duties
based on normative values of respect and concern for right-less
others may have to precede the establishment of rights. After
having recognized that rights are essential, she also concludes
that "rights" under the Western contractual model are extremely
difficult to apply "when we reach the inanimate area."'19 Midgley
places great weight on the concept of duties as a term that "can
properly be used over the whole range. We have quite simply got
many kinds of duties to animals, to plants and to the biosphere.
But to speak in this way we must free the term once and for all
from its restrictive contractual use."12 ° If duties are taken
seriously, then rights will flow from duties as correlates of those
duties, but the definition of "rights" will have to take on a
meaning that is different from contractual relationships between
those who have duties and those who, through dint of their own
individual abilities, can identify, understand, articulate, and
enforce their rights.'2 '
Midgley enters the discussion of moral duties by way of
rewriting the story of Robinson Crusoe such that he torches the
island as he leaves.'22 Does Crusoe have duties towards the
island even though the island is not a type of entity that is
thought to have rights (from which his duties would derive in a
correlative rights/duty construct)? Does he have duties towards
the island even though it is a "stranger" to him and not his
homeland, towards which one would be expected to have
normative commitments and duties?'23 Midgley concludes that
Crusoe can be said to have duties, if duties are defined without
reference to the narrow model of Western law and justice:
Duties need not be quasi-contractual relations between
symmetrical pairs of rational human agents. There are all
119 Midgley, Duties Concerning Islands at 175-76 (cited in note 97).
120 Id at 176.
121 Id at 175-76.
122 Id at 166.
123 Midgley makes this point in another context as well. In Animals and Why They
Matter, she argues that animal rights advocates (whom she calls "zoophiles") call for too
simplistic a notion of breaking down barriers to an appropriate consideration of animals.
She rejects the idea of speciesism, claiming that it is a natural result of human
identification with reference points outside themselves. She argues for respect for
animals, regardless of natural human inclinations to value entities that have direct
meaning to individuals, such as their immediate families, those who live in the same




kind of other obligations holding between asymmetrical
pairs, or involving, as in this case [of Robinson Crusoe
and the island], no outside beings at all. To speak of
duties to things ... is not necessarily to personify them
superstitiously, or to indulge in chatter about the "secret
life of plants." It expresses merely that there are suitable
and unsuitable ways of behaving in given situations.
People have duties as farmers, parents, consumers, forest
dwellers, colonists, species members, ship-wrecked
mariners, tourists, potential ancestors and actual
descendants, etc. As such, it is the business of each not to
forget his transitory and dependent position, the rich gifts
which he has received, and the tiny part he plays in a
vast, irreplaceable and fragile whole.124
While Midgley is writing from a moral philosopher's
perspective, Stone, who also believes that rights are essential,
seems to take a similar tack in proposing that duties can precede
the establishment of rights. "What the environment must look
for is that its interests be taken into account in subtler, more
procedural ways." "' He cites the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA") as a "splendid example of this sort of rights-
making through the elaboration of procedural safeguards,"126
which include requirements that potential harms to the
environment be assessed as a precursor to "every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other
major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment."127 Stone is aware of the problem that
procedural mechanisms such as this are only as good as the will
to use them and to enforce them, and he is careful to address the
issue by stating that NEPA has had positive effects of the type
he claims.12 8 For the purposes of this Article, however, the most
important point is that that same problem arises in the context
of establishing legal rights; questions about the will to use and to
enforce laws are not uniquely troubling with respect to
establishing legal duties first. The problem of enforcement
pervades law.
124 Midgley, Duties Concerning Islands at 178 (cited in note 97).
125 Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? at 36 (cited in note 57).
126 Id.
127 Id (citing NEPA).
128 Id.
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The law of animal protection is not totally lacking in
examples similar to Stone's example of NEPA. The Animal
Welfare Act ("AWA") requires researchers to consider
alternatives to using animals in order to accomplish their
research objectives. 129 That provision would most likely have
remained an empty legal exhortation had no organization such
as the Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights ("AVAR")
taken seriously the requirement of "consideration" of
alternatives as including the obligation to actually use viable
alternatives. AVAR and members of some veterinary medical
school communities petitioned the United States Department of
Agriculture ("USDA"), which enforces the AWA, to require
veterinary medical schools to actually perform the searches that
would lead to alternatives to terminal uses of animals in
veterinary medical education programs.13 ° The AVAR petition
("Petition") called for interpretation of the duty to consider
alternatives as a duty to actually use the alternatives if
consideration yielded viable alternatives to the use of animals.
By the time of the Petition, 13 of the 28 US veterinary
medical schools had stopped requiring terminal uses of animals
in their core courses, and of those 13 schools, 7 had stopped
requiring terminal uses of animals in their elective courses as
well. '3 It is not clear that those veterinary medical schools did so
because they understood it to be their duty to do so, 132 but it was,
at least, quite clear from their decision that terminal uses of
animals were not necessary for veterinary medical education. In
response to the Petition, the USDA determined that the AWA
129 7 USC § 2143 (2005).
130 A VAR Files Petition With USDA: Seeks to Eliminate Violations of Federal Law, 70
AVAR Directions 1, 1 (Winter 2003), available at <http://www.avar.org/
avarwinter_2003_directions.pdf> (last visited Jan 21, 2006); Linnea Stull, AVAR
Addresses Violations of Federal Amal Welfare Act With UDSA Petition-Students Join
as Co-Petitioners, 23 AVAR Alteratives 1, 1 (Apr 2003), available at
<http://www.avar.org/avar _apr_2003_alternatives.pdf> (last visited Jan 21, 2006).
131 Harmful Animal Use in Veterinary Training on the Decline, 77 AVAR Directions 1,
1 (Winter 2005), available at <http://www.avar. org/dirwinter2006.pdf> (last visited Jan
21, 2006).
132 In the spring of 2003, I was invited to present to associate deans of veterinary
medical schools information about students' legal rights to refuse to conduct experiments
or lab exercises on healthy living animals. Several associate deans spoke about their
alternative programs, which had arisen in a variety of ways including student initiatives,
faculty proposals, and outsiders' suggestions (such as specific proposals for supervised
diagnosis and treatment of animals actually in need of treatment). At that time, the
AVAR petition had been filed but not yet acted upon by the USDA. None of the associate
deans whose schools were using alternatives stated that they were doing so because, they
understood the AWA to require that they do so.
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does require veterinary medical schools to use viable alternatives
to terminal procedures and not just to "consider" them.133 This
interpretation incorporates "use" within "consideration" of
alternatives and results in a duty to actually use, not just
consider, alternatives when alternatives exist.
Can it be said that the AWA created the duty to use
alternatives? I don't think so. The AWA explicitly created only
the duty to consider those alternatives, and "consideration" was
not defined. A significant number of veterinary medical schools'
decision to use alternatives created the presumption that
consideration of alternatives would lead to their use and that
rejection of good alternatives would be tantamount to not
considering them at all. Authority was still vested in veterinary
medical schools to decide which alternatives are worth
considering (and using). Nevertheless, the existence of the
AWA's requirement of "consideration" created the circumstances
under which schools that did not want to-and might never have
wanted to-use alternatives were required to do so nonetheless.
An even more difficult question is whether rights could be or
are derived from any of these examples of Crusoe's duties
towards the island, NEPA's requirement of impact appraisals,
and the AWA's provision that alternatives to animal usage be
considered. Midgley raises but doesn't answer the question, and,
after all, her example is purely hypothetical. Stone is definitely
troubled by this question, which is why he spends so much time
on the central question of his thesis: should trees have
standing?"a That is, without the means to enforce the duty, the
existence of the duty by itself only exhorts correct action but does
not, in actuality, require it. Rights approaches do not differ on
this score, however. Given the unique characteristics of animals'
communication, establishing legal rights for animals or aspects
of the environment does nothing, pragmatically speaking,
without the establishment of a guardianship system through
which the claims of the rights-holder can be heard. In both cases,
133 Nearly Every Veterinary School Cited by USDA for Non-Compliance with Federal
Law, 25 AVAR Alternatives 2, 2 (Jan 2004), available at <http'//www.avar.org/
avarwinter_2004_alternatives.pdf> (last visited Jan 21, 2006).
134 In subsequent writings about providing, trees. and aspects of the environment with
standing, Stone examines many of the troubling questions that arise if one seriously
contemplates rights for entities that are not humans and not capable of representing
themselves directly. For example, he explores the issues of "nonperson" status under the
law, the need for guardians, and opponents' worries about opening floodgates to litigation
if every aspect of nature had standing in court. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?
(cited in note 57).
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humans or organizations will have to represent the rights-
holder.
At this point, perhaps it is helpful to contrast the rights
advocacy approach with the duties advocacy approach. Suppose
that animal rights advocates had decided on the project of
banning terminal uses of living animals in veterinary medical
schools. This would meet at least some of Francione's
requirements for an advocacy project that advances animal
rights because it bans the use of animals altogether (albeit only
when alternatives exist) rather than simply modifying the means
by which such use would continue.'35 If advocates focus on
establishing rights for animals (and among those rights, the
right not to be used for terminal procedures in veterinary
medical school), animals' advocates must focus on the animals
themselves as sufficiently like humans to justify their receiving
such rights. Their capacity to suffer, the value of their lives to
them, or other aspects of the animals themselves would lead the
argument for rights-based protection from (ab)use in terminal
procedures.
By focusing on animals' suffering as a means of arguing that
animals are sufficiently like humans that justice demands
protecting them from this exploitation, advocates would be
adopting the framework by which opponents of animal rights
have consistently prevailed. That is, opponents of animal rights
consistently argue that justice does not require treating animals
like humans because, they claim, animals are not sufficiently
like humans that their situation invokes similar justice issues
and concerns. From an opponent's point of view it is appropriate
simply to anesthetize the animal properly so that the animal not
suffer. Ironically, in focusing on the similarity between animals
and humans with respect to their capacity to suffer, animals'
advocates play directly into opponents' position that anesthesia
will solve whatever moral dilemma exists in using animals.
Advocates may be using the capacity to suffer as an argument for
rights that would spare animals from exploitation that results in
suffering, but opponents claim that the capacity to suffer entails
only the right to freedom from suffering within the context of
exploitation. Thus, even if the theoretical feasibility of rights
exists, it is virtually impossible to overcome opposition that
justice is adequately served with minimal standards of care, that
humans and animals are too differently situated to justify
135 Francione, Rain without Thunder at 192 (cited in note 28).
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establishing rights for animals, and that "rights" are not
necessary to address most of the specific problems identified by
animals' advocates.
By contrast, advocates seeking enactment of the AWA did
not present the AWA as an effort to secure rights for animals at
all. In fact, the AWA was originally motivated by the more
limited aim of preventing the theft of companion animals for
research purposes.136 For that purpose, the AWA created a
system of licensing suppliers of animals to research facilities.
13 7
The Animal Welfare Institute used the occasion of the
introduction of the AWA to press for changes in the research
setting itself.3 ' The AWA is woefully inadequate from an
animals' advocate's point of view,'39 but the same pragmatic
result that rights advocates would seek-the duty to use
alternatives-has been at least partially realized through a
confluence of the development of alternatives to the use of live
animals, some veterinary schools' adoption of those alternatives,
and additional advocacy by the Association of Veterinarians for
Animal Rights.
The AWA as a whole does not even approximate Francione's
requirements for incremental establishment of rights for animals
to be free from exploitation. It actually furthers exploitation of
animals. I have already noted the AWA's exclusion, as a matter
of its specific legal definition of animals, of most research
animals. There is serious lack of oversight of researchers, and, as
legal scholar Darian M. Ibrahim documents, that lack of
oversight in concert with the AWA's emphasis on the "three R's"
of reducing, refining, and replacing animals furthers exploitation
of animals. 4 ' It is only in the effective advocacy use of one little
piece of the AWA-the "consideration of alternatives" provision-
that an outcome that looks the same as the "rights-based" project
of banning terminal procedures on animals in veterinary medical
136 Christine Stevens, LaboratoryAnimal Welfare, in Emily Stewart Leavitt, et al, eds
Animals and Their Legal Rights 66, 73-77 (Animal Welfare Inst 4th ed 1990).
137 7 USC §§ 2133, 2142 (2005). Unfortunately, this has been a total disaster. The
licensing system, by creating Class B ("random source") dealers, actually enhances the
possibility that stolen companion animals will be used in research settings. At the time of
this writing, bills in Congress purport to solve that problem by changing the Class B
dealer system: Pet Safety and Protection Act of 2005, S Rep No 451, 109th Cong, 1st Sess
(2005); Pet Animal Welfare Statute of 2005, S Rep No 1139, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (2005);
Pet Animal Welfare Statute of 2005, HR Rep No 2669, 109th Cong, 1st Sess (2005).
138 Stevens, LaboratoryAnimal Welfare at 71 (cited in note 136).
139 Ibrahim, 2006 U Chi Legal F 195, 223-28 (cited in note 73)
140 Id.
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education could emerge. Looking for and creating those kinds of
advocacy spaces is necessary in a society that is so tremendously
invested in animal exploitation despite considerable normative
support for sparing animals from cruel treatment.
Due to the significant pragmatic difficulties associated with
the power of institutional owners of animals and a paradigm of
justice that requires newcomers to prove their similarity to
existing rights-holders, it is virtually impossible to be "pure" in
the pursuit of rights or duties. Even so, advocates should at least
use a rights-based approach to the establishment and
enforcement of duties in order to guide their efforts and in order
to gauge when to exit a particular legislative reform attempt that
might be more successful later, under different circumstances.
As a guide to action, advocates would do well to seek imposition
of those types of duties on exploiters of animals that can be
enforced with the effect of prohibiting practices that a
straightforward rights-based advocacy approach would use
under the Francione model of legal rights creation. They must
then follow-up by using as effectively as possible the small
advocacy space that is thereby supplied.
In this regard, Francione's criticism of "legal welfarism" is as
important in the context of duty imposition as it is in the context
of rights acquisition.'41 Advocates do not meaningfully advance
the cause of respect for animals when they urge (or agree to)
compromises that allow exploiters to exploit animals more
"humanely." They advance the cause of exploiters. To be a
meaningful part of an agenda of removing animals from the
category of "commodities," an advocacy project cannot be
141 While participants in the animal protection movement may distinguish between
the pursuit of animal welfare (humane treatment of animals without challenging the
institutional practices of exploitation) and pursuit of animal welfare reform for the
purpose of incremental abolition of institutional practices of exploitation, Francione
considers both welfare for the purpose of welfare and welfare as a step towards rights as
flawed. In his view they are flawed because they fail to challenge the foundation of
animal exploitation: the legal property status of animals. In particular as to the latter,
Francione disputes the idea that incremental abolition of exploitation can occur when
reforms fail to remove the entitlements of animal (ab)users to confine and exploit animals
as they choose. For example, simply increasing the cage space allocated to hens will not
change the basic pattern of exploitation. By contrast, prohibiting the caging of animals
would recognize the bodily integrity interest of animals (an animal's "basic" right) and
strike a blow to the basic institutional entitlement to treat animals as things. These ideas
are discussed at length in Francione, Rain Without Thunder at 126-39 (cited in note 28).
I argue that, similarly, if duties are pursued only with such goals as making cages
bigger rather than eliminating cages altogether, duty imposition will result in no more
progress for animals than would welfarist legal reform which is mistakenly undertaken
to secure rights for animals.
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structured around making exploitation more palatable. Seeking
a duty on factory farmers to provide more space to hens can be
expected only to increase commodification and consumption of
animals, furthering the definition of them as "things to eat"; it
can be expected only to make consumers more comfortable with a
choice to consume animals. Rather, the advocacy project should
be structured around exposing or banning legal entitlements
exploiters have to exploit animals at all.
To remove this human definitional overlay on animals that
they are commodities for human consumption, while operating in
a society that has gone very far downstream in defining animals
as such, requires careful thought as to duties that can be
imposed in ways that actually lead to less utilization of animals.
Through thoughtful advocacy perhaps the doors to exploitation
can be closed even as doors to alternatives are opened until,
ultimately, consumers reach the tipping point of choosing non-
animal-based products and services. Thoughtful advocacy that
opens doors to alternatives are those advocacy efforts that
support consumer-palatable vegan choices and effective non-
animal-based chemical evaluation measures, for example. Not
just any duty to treat animals "better" will do. Thoughtful
advocacy that closes doors to exploitation is advocacy premised
on the creation of duties to consider and to refrain from animal
exploitative actions that directly affect animals' basic needs for
physical safety and bodily integrity. Thus, eliminating abusive
practices altogether, rather than modifying them so as to make
them less painful, would have to underlie both the effort and the
outcome of the advocacy. 
142
CONCLUSION
Feminism seeks to empower women on our own terms....
We seek not only to be valued as who we are, but to have
access to the process of the definition of value itself.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 22
(Harvard 1987).
142 Perhaps this is a version of the same argument made by Barry Commoner with
respect to environmental pollutants. Commoner challenges environmental regulatory
goals that seek to identify and maintain pollution at tolerable levels rather than taking
the steps necessary to ban known pollutants altogether. Barry Commoner, The Falure of
the EnvironmentaI Effort, 91 Current History 564, 564-65 (1992).
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Animals are not allowed to define their lives. Indeed, their
very bodies are defined by humans, in accordance with human
preferences. The process by which we modify and define animals
is domestication. Through domestication, humans have changed
the very physical nature of animals, and it is an ongoing process
by which we create animals we can exploit more and more easily
because of our previous and continuing distortions of their
biology. Previously domesticated animals are being modified
further, formerly wild animals are being newly domesticated,
and entirely new forms of life are being generated in laboratories
around the world. We literally make the very animals whose
trust we then betray when we abandon them on streets or to
animal shelters, turn them into flesh-foods, or torture them in
the interest of extracting a little information that can only
potentially help us with a problem that is usually of our own
making. Manufacturing an animal does not lead to heightened
care of animals; manufacturing an animal leads to reduced care
of animals because it is the manufacturing process itself, and the
sense of entitlement to manufacture animals, that leads to
objectification and commodification of animals in ways that
preclude attention to their needs.
Domestication as a process and a value is so engrained that
the depth of its denigration of animals eludes us. Humans alive
today were born into a world already structured around willful
distortion and manipulation of animals, and so it is difficult to
hear the word "domesticated" as the pejorative, disrespectful
label it is. Quite the contrary, domestication is glorified and
romanticized as the path by which humans "rescued" animals
from nature and by which humans have become reciprocally
"tamed" through their association with "gentle beasts."'
Feminists have educated us about what "taming" has done (and
continues to do) to women, but the more literal lesson-its
origins and literal meaning in the context of domesticating
animals-has not received a great deal of focused attention.
Feminists have not been quick to draw parallels because most
feminists have tried to distance women from the category of
animals.'
143 See, for example, Roger Caras, A Perfect Harmony (Simon & Schuster 1996)
(detailing the ways in which humans' and animals' lives have intertwined over time such
that humans are made better).
144 Catharine A. MacKinnon, who has written of the false distinction inherent in
separating "mice from men" (see note 75), has also written of women's perceptions of
degradation when they are classified as or compared to animals.
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The legal process by which we have facilitated domestication
(and an even more rapid technological manufacture of animals
through transgenic animal research) is, fundamentally, a process
of privatization of animals and human modifications of animals
as the legal property of people who have reduced animals to their
control. The ability to patent life forms creates incentives to
experiment with various combinations of living material and
technical processes. Although there were legal disputes about
whether mice engineered to develop cancer or bacteria modified
How do you know when a group is on the bottom? It may be some indication
when they can be assaulted, and authorities ignore them, physically abused,
and people turn away or find it entertaining; economically deprived, and it is
seen as all they are worth; made the object of jokes, and few ask what makes
the jokes funny; imaged as animallike, confined to a narrow range of tasks and
functions, and told it is all harmless or inevitable and even for their benefit as
well as the best they can expect, given what they are. These are all true of
women.
MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodfiedat 30 (cited in note 75) (emphasis added).
Although liberal feminism, with this desire to avoid identification with nature,
does seem to dominate feminist discourse, there is a strand of feminism (ecofeminism)
that:
[b]egins from the acknowledgement that patriarchal cultures enable the male
domination of both nature and women and this potentially opens up a space for an
identification of women with nature ... . Rather than challenging the connection
between nature and women, some ecofeminists seem to want to celebrate it. The
attempt to dominate nature has its corollary in society with men's attempt to
dominate and subjugate women. The two forms of domination are intimately
connected. This means that women have a special interest in ecology, but also that
attempts to defend nature must be attempts to defend women against patriarchal
domination. In short, radical ecology is as much about women as it is about nature.
Sutton, Nature, Environment, and Society at 106 (cited in note 62). For other overviews
of ecofeminist perspectives, see Greta Gaard, ed, Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature
(Temple 1993) (discussing the interconnection between women and nature); Carolyn
Merchant, Radical Ecology: The Search for a Livable World 193-223 (Routledge 2d ed
2005) (discussing liberal, cultural, social, and socialist forms of ecofeminism and how
each speak to the connection between women and nature); Kathy J. Warren, Ecofeminist
Philosophy: A Western Perspective on What It Is and Why It Matters 43 (Rowman &
Littlefield 2000) (arguing that there are "important interconnections among the
unjustified dominations of women, other human Others, and nonhuman nature" and
"feminist philosophy should include ecofeminist insights into" these relationships).
There is a strand of feminism that examines specifically questions of feminism and
animal liberation. See, for example, Lori Gruen, Dismantling Oppression: An Analysis of
the Connection Between Women and Animals, in Greta Gaard, ed, Ecofeminism 60-91
(Temple 1993) (arguing that no attempt to liberate women can occur without some
attempt to liberate nature); Carol J. Adams, ed, Ecofeminism and the Sacred (Continuum
1994) (explaining how "environmental explotation, unbridled consumerism, ...
exploitation of animals, pollution of the Ganges, and other environmental issues are
precisely the concerns of ecofeminist spiritualities"); Carol J. Adams and Josephine
Donovan, eds, Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Duke 1995)
(questioning whether the original male pattern of domination over women was "not itself
preceded by and modeled upon the domination of animals by humans").
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by humans could be "property,"'45  for example, it is
unremarkable that courts agreed to allow human ownership of
such patents and the products of those patents. After all, it was
mere extension of existing legal concepts of animals to do so.
Francione makes a strong case for de-privatizing animals by
incrementally establishing basic rights for animals. However,
that path involves many digressions for the purpose of defining
which animals are worthy of rights entitlements, and it may not
be the only pathway through which human control and
manipulation of animals can be significantly eroded. This Article
calls for employing Francione's criteria for rights-centered
advocacy as the basis for advocacy projects designed to establish
duties on humans to develop means of meeting human needs in
ways that do not exploit animals or destroy their (and our)
habitats. Creating such duties appropriately redirects advocacy
attention from making humans' exploitation of animals more
acceptable and, instead, places advocacy attention on stripping
away commodifying practices and entitlements.
Using the criteria of rights-based advocacy for animals to
advocate particular legislation and to enforce the resultant
inevitable political compromise legislation requires focused work,
because it is difficult to know exactly which duties will actually
result in room to prohibit exploitative practices. The duties
cannot simply make exploitation nicer for animals, or, as in the
case of veterinary medicine, seek alternatives to certain uses of
animals. Advocates must seek interpretations of duties that
actually prohibit exploitative uses. Despite these difficulties,
focusing on duties is advantageous because it addresses three
problems with advocacy that focuses on rights: (1) delays and
debates about which animals should or can have rights, (2)
inability to protect those things essential to animals' existence,
well-being, and ability to define or structure their own lives
(because of the narrow definition of who or what can be rights-
holders), and (3) difficulty turning the spotlight directly on
exploiters and exploitative practices.
145 Animal Legal Defense Fund v Quigg, 932 F2d 920 (Fed Cir 1991); Harvard College
v Canada, 2002SCR 76 (Canada 2002); Diamond v Chakrabarty, 447 US 303 (1980);
Andrea Kamage and Julie Heider, So What, Exactly, Is Human ; When our DNA blends
with that of other beasts, new creatures vex the Patent Office, Legal Times (June 20,
2005); Gerald Dworkin, Should There be Property R'ghts in Genes, 352 Philosophical
Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 1077, 1079-81 (1997), available at
<httpJ/www.journals.royalsoc.ac.uk/(wqldsv45eombhrvpfxwhh55)/app/home/content.as
p?referrer--contribution&format=2&page=l&pagecount=10> (last visited Jan 21, 2006).
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All three problems-delays, inadequate results, and lack of
attention to questioning the moral entitlement of exploiters-
result from reliance on a narrow model of correlative rights and
duties between equally situated actors and a paradigm of justice
that defines a just society as one in which like entities are
treated alike. It is difficult to prove that animals (not to mention
rivers and plants) are sufficiently like humans to justify giving
them rights, through which duties to respect those rights could
be established. Advocates' claims of "justice" for the environment
or for animals fall on deaf ears to the extent that neither the
contractual model of correlative rights and duties nor the
paradigm of "like entities" is satisfied. Protection of animals
premised on the establishment of actual rights for only a select
few animals cannot possibly provide the type of protection all
animals need in order to continue to co-exist with us on the
planet. Besides, establishing rights carries its own set of
problems, such as who will speak for animals with rights or how
to resolve issues of inter-species competition for limited
resources. It will not tell us how to solve problems of protecting
endangered fresh water trout and sturgeon in Montana who are
dependent on water that may be equally necessary to protect
endangered salmon in Washington and Oregon.
Meanwhile, the motivations and machinations of those who
want to harm animals go relatively unnoticed and unaddressed.
The motivations and entitlements of those who want to trap and
remove or eradicate the peafowl on Palos Verdes Peninsula are
never part of an explicit debate about peafowl because that
debate is focused on how peafowl are or should be legally defined.
Nor is the (lack of) need for dismembering fallow deer bodies
discussed when the issue is framed merely as one of curing
technical flaws in the definition of "domestic animals" or
"livestock."
We need to ask by what moral right animals are (ab)used in
these ways. How could we become so cavalier about injecting
pieces of wire into young salmon's heads so that we can forcibly
use their own bodies as scientific research instruments in our
quest to distort and modify salmon? We need to focus directly on
those attitudes and activities. Instead of debating questions
about the worthiness of animals to be protected, we need to ask
such pointed, basic questions as who, under what moral right, is
manipulating water in disruptive, destructive ways, and who,
under what moral right, is manipulating fish populations such
that populations are being distorted. I have no doubt that the
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debates that ensue from such starting points will circle back into
narrow debates about the worthiness of animals. Even so, the
focus needs to be continually expanded and brought back to the
type and scope of destruction wrought by abusive conduct.
This Article argues that the starting point of advocacy for
rights makes a difference. Advocates need to begin by asking
questions that make most salient what is at stake when animals
and aspects of the environment are reduced to the status of
"resources" and "property" of humans. They must also resist
engaging in the gaming that surrounds use of the justice claim
that like entities be treated alike. They can never win that game
because animals can always be defined as sufficiently different
from humans to justify treating them much worse than humans.
A paradigm of rights and duties that exists outside the frame of
contractual negotiation between equally-situated humans will
have to emerge from such advocacy. Finally, a paradigm of
justice that requires justification for exclusion and intolerance of
difference, rather than requiring justification for inclusion and
protection, shifts the burden to those who would do harm and
requires the search for, and development and use of, alternatives
to harmful practices. Without the pressure of a more inclusive
paradigm of justice, those "alternatives" can never become the
new baseline by which even more respectful "alternatives" are
developed. Because domestication and human imperiousness
with respect to animals and the environment is so deep-seated, it
will be necessary to proceed by creating duties in specific, limited
contexts through which specific rights can be derived.
Nevertheless, the goal should be challenging the underlying
arrogance with which humans literally make and re-make the
world without regard to its other inhabitants.
194
